Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state

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Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state Jun 16, 2014 5:14:31 GMT

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Post by Admin on Jun 16, 2014 5:14:31 GMT

Any analysis of what has gone wrong in Iraq inevitably begins with George W Bush and Tony Blair. Bush went to war to settle scores with Saddam Hussein on behalf of his father, who failed to remove him during the first war in 1991. Regime change was his goal and he was open about it. Blair’s aim was the same but he was required to use sleights of hand to secure the legal authority he required. The rest is dodgy dossiers, non-existent weapons of mass destruction and history.

By the end of this year, Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry will finally report – after agreeing not to publish important correspondence between president and prime minister. This deal with Whitehall will deprive the report of some corroborating evidence, but the row is a largely confected one. The story is long known. Blair, while at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002, gave his famous “I’ll be with you, come what may” assurance. He prepared for war among his tight coterie, but had to keep it a secret. That is no way to launch a reconstruction, and that is where British domestic politics collide with the streets of Mosul and Tikrit. The speed and success of the original invasion in March 2003 reinforced the hubris of the Americans and the British. They believed, absurdly, that their vague notions of installing democracy would trump all the problems.

The US-led interim administration was a bickering mess. The removal of Iraq’s security and political elite spawned disgruntled and heavily armed militia. Bomb attacks began to take place daily. It took months for any proper public services to be restored, while chaos ensued on the streets. By this point, many Iraqis had despaired of their supposed liberators and were easy prey for factional groups. Having declared “mission accomplished”, Bush did not want to hear the detail.

The murder in a Baghdad bomb attack in August 2003 of the UN special representative to Iraq, Sergio de Mello, was a turning point. The respected Brazilian envoy was seen as one of few international figures who could reconcile the different factions. It is not as if they weren’t warned. In the months leading up to the invasion, Blair received a stream of advice from experts warning of the potential conflagration. Arguments such as these were dismissed as defeatist. Instead, president and prime minister pursued the policy of the simpleton.

Blair now admits he underestimated the complexity of Iraq. “The biggest single lesson out of Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere is once you lift the lid off these very repressive regimes, out come pouring these tribal, ethnic and, in particular, religious influences,” he told me last year. The most important difference between 2003 and 2013, he maintained, “is a recognition that once you do lift the lid off – as you can see in Syria today or Yemen or Tunisia, Libya, wherever, Egypt – a fresh set of problems begin. That doesn’t mean to say you leave the regimes in place, by the way, but it does mean you have got to be prepared for a far longer engagement.” It was intriguing to hear, after all these years, a little contrition.

His logic of perpetual intervention has at least the merit of consistency. The only time order was properly established was between 2007 and 2011 during the American “surge”. The period from mid-2006 to mid-2007 had been the bloodiest in the conflict, with more than 1,000 US personnel and many more Iraqi civilians dead. The Americans had been holed up in their bases, making the occasional and invariably bloody incursion, but largely leaving the militias to wreak havoc.

It took the deployment of an extra 20,000 US personnel – a deeply contentious decision – to reinforce security and bolster the Iraqi government. That government, however, soon became part of the problem. As ever, the occupying forces look for someone on whom they can rely. In Afghanistan, they found Hamid Karzai; in Iraq it was Maliki. When he became prime minister in 2006, he vowed to crack down on insurgents. At the same time, he has always been a divisive figure, partly within the government itself, but more importantly in Iraq’s deeply divided sectarian landscape. Now, in the ultimate of ironies, the US is scampering towards Iran – its arch enemy for decades – in a bid to stem the advance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

As Sir Kieran Prendergast, a former deputy to Kofi Annan at the UN, says: “I don’t know whether the Iranian government kneel down to pray, but if they did they should have been kneeling in thankfulness to the Bush regime for the boost which the Iraq war gave to the standing of Iran in the Middle East.” The hasty retreat of the Americans from Iraq in 2011 has left the country gravely exposed to extremist groups. Just as intervention in Iraq has created a swath of problems, non-intervention has done so, too. The decision to do nothing in Syria, then to threaten action a year ago, only to abandon the idea at the last moment, has damaged the credibility of the international community. It has also ensured that the world is confronted by two evils in that country: either the tyrant Assad or extreme Islamist forces of rebellion. The small band of moderates opposed to the regime is nowhere now to be seen, having been abandoned by the West.

It is one of the cruel ironies of the past few decades of Middle East politics that largely secular dictators, from Saddam Hussein to Assad, to Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, even to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, have been seen to be the most capable of keeping their countries together. That cruel realisation should not scupper hopes for a better future. But it does provide pause for thought. Having declared a decade of war over, President Obama is reluctant to become embroiled in Iraq again, but he is expected to agree to the limited use of air power to try to take out ISIS forces. Opinion polls demonstrate the extent of the jaundice among voters.

Increasingly, the US relies on unmanned drones: warfare shorn of the sensitivity of soldiers brought home in body bags. Politicians and the public are largely insulated from its effects. Drones can take people out, but they cannot build nations or better systems of government. For all the despair and deceit on the road to war in 2003, it is worth remembering that many who became involved, both civilians and military personnel, did so for honourable reasons. They believed they could do something remarkable, replacing a dictator with democracy. That very notion now seems laughably naïve. Iraq has been let down not just by the West, but also by competing powers in the region, and political forces inside the country intent on pursuing sectarian vendettas and personal self-enrichment.

Iraq is close to becoming a failed state. Basic services are found wanting; living standards have fallen. Security is non-existent. Sectarian violence is out of control. Regional and global security is threatened; entire population groups are being displaced. The threat of terrorism has increased, while the West’s erstwhile enemy number one, Iran, has benefited. That is some scoresheet.

John Kampfner is author of 'Blair’s Wars’ (Free Press, £7.99). His latest book, 'The Rich: From Salves to Super-Yachts’, will be published by Little, Brown in October

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Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state Jun 17, 2014 5:18:12 GMT

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Post by Admin on Jun 17, 2014 5:18:12 GMT

Eleven years on and American revenge against Iraq’s Sunnis is looking more disastrous by the day. Saddam Hussein was a Sunni and in the mind of the victorious Bush neo-cons his defeat in 2003 meant his fellow Sunnis should also pay dearly. For Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Bremer and the rest of them that had a purity to it. So, not long after Saddam was swept from power, the policy of de-Baathification was imposed. Sectarianism is another name for it.(Saddam was many things, but not a bigot. He dispensed cruelty even-handedly and he was feared equally by Shia, Sunni, Kurd and Christian alike.)

Members of the Baath Party were almost exclusively Sunni, so their dismissal from the ranks of the police and army and from the corridors of political power meant the disenfranchisement of Iraq’s Sunnis, around 40 per cent of the country’s population. Because they had a past they were told they had no future. They were turned away, defeated and resentful. More than a decade later the dissent that lingers among Iraq’s Sunnis is the greatest strength on which ISIS can draw. Isis are playing the role of liberators in Mosul, the mainly Sunni city they captured without a fight last week. They are putting the lights on, opening bazaars.

“No more Ali Babas in Mosul,” a lorry driver shouted to me as he headed back to the city on Sunday. What he meant was that as far as he was concerned the thieving police officers and soldiers from the Iraqi security forces had been routed and good riddance. Residents who’ve stayed are saying the city is peaceful and that Isis fighters are being very kind. But chilling photographs posted by Isis of civilian-clothed young men being marched off to execution underline the brutality of what’s going on here. Those young men were security force members who had surrendered. Mainly Shia, Isis has shown them no mercy.

Iraq has broken up into three pieces, a Kurdish north, a Sunni centre and a Shia south, taking in Baghdad. Broadly speaking the military forces in control of each area has the support of the locals. Putting these pieces back together again, making them the country we knew as Iraq, looks almost impossible. There is no political process to speak off. No negotiations are taking place that might bring a ceasefire. Sectarian hatred has been re-kindled and it might be years before fighting between the three areas can be halted.

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Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state Jun 18, 2014 13:34:27 GMT

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Post by Admin on Jun 18, 2014 13:34:27 GMT

Regardless of whether the Iraqi government in Baghdad rolls back the recent military advances by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the central authority has suffered a mortal blow. ISIS's takeover of most of the so-called Sunni Triangle, as well as Mosul, the second largest city with almost two million people, hammers a deadly nail in the coffin of the post-Saddam Hussein nation-building project.

It is doubtful if Baghdad could ever establish a monopoly on the use of force in the country, or exercise authority and centralised control over rebellious Sunni Arabs and semi-independent Kurdistan. The best-case scenario for Iraq is devolution of power from the centre in Baghdad to local Shia, Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurdish communities; the worst is splintering of the country to three separate entities. ISIS's swift advance has exposed the state's structural and institutional weaknesses, as well as a deep ideological and sectarian rift in society.

After eight years in office and monopolising power, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has delivered neither security nor reconciliation and prosperity. Iraqi security forces, which number hundreds of thousands of men, almost disintegrated under a stunning sweep of only a few thousand, lightly armed al-Qaeda-linked fighters. More than a decade after the Americans removed Saddam Hussein from power and dissolved his army, the reconstituted military lacks a unifying identity and professionalism, and is riddled with corruption.

For example, in Mosul, ISIS militants had a joy-ride through the city because senior and junior officers had already deserted their positions and weapons, and ordered soldiers to flee home. A security force in Mosul made up of tens of thousands melted away. Coming to the rescue of a sinking ship, a representative of the highest Shia authority in the land, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, said the "defence of Iraq and its people and holy sites is a duty on every citizen who can carry arms and fight terrorists". A parallel army of an estimated 100,000 volunteers, mainly Shia, has joined the fray, increasing the risks of sectarian strife.

As Sunni militants surge across Iraq, snapping up a vast swath of territory that straddles the Syrian border, those who are seeking to stop them are running out of options. Iraq’s army has already proved itself brittle and weak. Washington is understandably reluctant to deploy troops. Even Iran – a genuine ally in this particular quest to contain the Sunni insurgency – appears flat-footed. Small clusters of Iranian fighters who have crossed the border are hopelessly outnumbered by the jihadist fighters that fill the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

At the moment, the world’s best hope appears to lie in Kurdistan and its peshmerga fighters. The peshmerga – whose name literally means “those who confront death” – are capable and disciplined. They are already engaged in limited actions against ISIL insurgents, but the Kurds are strategically and militarily capable of much more. In the past, they have acted as allies, fighting side by side with American troops in the 2003 Iraq war, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since then, they have proved to be a key factor in maintaining security in Iraqi Kurdistan, which remains an island of relative calm in the current wave of Iraq’s chaos.

The Kurds are able to take on ISIL, but it remains unclear whether they are willing to do so. A central obstacle is their long-simmering dispute with Baghdad over the sale of oil. The Kurdistan Regional Government has long argued it has the right to export its oil and gas directly. That position has drawn the ire of Iraq’s central government, which has frozen Kurdistan’s budget, while threatening international buyers with legal action. Baghdad’s fear has been that, if it allows Kurdistan the right to export, other provinces would follow suit, undermining the power of the central government. The United States has generally backed Baghdad’s claims. Now, with the future of Iraq hanging in the balance, the oil dispute seems nothing more than a marginal distraction. With Iraq in turmoil, Kurdistan is already planning to increase oil exports, ignoring the central government’s objections.

Nevertheless, to get Kurdish fighters fully aligned against the ISIL threat, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki should back down from his position on oil sales as a gesture of good faith. The United States, for its part, should make its commitment to back the Kurds clear, and provide the peshmerga with the military and logistical support needed. At this point, there are no perfect outcomes for Iraq. A weakened central government is still a far better alternative to the rise of an ISIL-backed Islamic caliphate. The West and its allies must act quickly to prevent that nightmare scenario from becoming reality.

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Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state Jun 24, 2014 14:48:21 GMT

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Post by Admin on Jun 24, 2014 14:48:21 GMT

Discussions of U.S. involvement in stemming the violence in Iraq are occurring amid a backdrop of highly negative views of the Iraq war, a new CBS News/New York Times poll out Monday reveals.

Just 18 percent of Americans think the result of the war in Iraq was worth the loss of American lives and other costs of attacking Iraq, the lowest percentage ever recorded in CBS News Polls. Seventy-five percent do not think the Iraq War was worth it, up eight percentage points since 2011 (just before all U.S. troops were removed), and up 30 points since August 2003.

Republicans, Democrats and independents alike view the Iraq war as not worth the costs.

As old sectarian rivalries erupt again in Iraq, some have criticized the removal of all U.S. troops from that country in 2011. Fifty percent think the U.S. should have removed all its troops, while 42 percent think the U.S. should have left some troops behind. Most Republicans think U.S. troops should have remained, while most Democrats and independents think they should have been removed.

More Americans from households with either an Iraq or Afghanistan War veteran think the U.S. should have left some troops behind in Iraq (43 percent), but they agree with Americans overall (20 percent) that the Iraq War was not worth the loss of life and other costs.

Military Options in Iraq

When Americans are asked about a range of military options in Iraq, there is support for some actions, but not others. A slim majority of Americans (51 percent) favor sending military advisers into Iraq to train and advise the Iraqi military and collect intelligence, which President Obama has proposed. Forty-two percent oppose it. There is bipartisan support for this plan. Nevertheless, four in 10 don't think that will have much of an effect on the violence there. Twenty-eight percent think sending advisers will increase the violence there, while 23 percent expect it to decrease.

In addition to sending military advisers into Iraq, there is public support for using unmanned aircraft or drones to target militants in Iraq - something the president has not ruled out. But there is less support for airstrikes using manned aircraft. Large majorities (77 percent), however, oppose sending U.S. ground troops into Iraq -- something President Obama has said the U.S. will not do. Republicans are more likely than Democrats or independents to support the use of drones and as well as manned airstrikes (although most oppose sending ground troops).

Fifty percent of Americans think the U.S. does not have a responsibility to do something about the recent violence in Iraq, while fewer - 42 percent - think the U.S. does. More Republicans than Democrats or independents think the U.S. has a responsibility to do something about the violence, but even among Republicans, 42 percent think that is not the U.S.'s responsibility.

The poll also suggests the public views the situation in Iraq with some futility; most Americans do not think the U.S. can do something about the situation in Iraq. Fifty-seven percent think the situation there is beyond the control of the U.S., including majorities of all partisans. Two-thirds of Americans have heard or read at least some about the recent violence in Iraq, but just 36 percent have heard or read a lot about it. Those who have been paying the most attention to news about Iraq are more inclined to think the U.S. has a responsibility there and that the President should be doing more about it.

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Why Iraq is close to becoming a failed state Jun 30, 2014 14:49:56 GMT

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Post by Admin on Jun 30, 2014 14:49:56 GMT

Iraqi troops battled to dislodge an al-Qaeda splinter group from the city of Tikrit on Monday after its leader was declared caliph of a new Islamic state in lands seized this month across a swathe of Iraq and Syria.

Alarming regional and world powers, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant claimed universal authority when it dropped the local element in its name and said its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was now “Caliph Ibrahim,” leader of the Muslim world. “Caliph” is a medieval title last widely recognized in the Ottoman sultanate, deposed 90 years ago after the First World War.

ISIL’s move, which follows a three-week drive for territory by militants and allies among Iraqi’s Sunni Muslim minority, aims to erase international borders drawn by colonial powers and defy Baghdad’s U.S.- and Iranian-backed, Shia-led government. It also poses a direct challenge to the global leadership of al-Qaeda, which has disowned it, and to conservative Gulf Arab Sunni rulers who already view the group as a security threat.

The Islamic State has used alliances with other, less radical Sunni armed groups and tribal fighters who are disillusioned with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Members of Hussein’s secular Baath party have also fought in the revolt. Its declaration of the Islamic State could isolate allies in Iraq and lead to infighting. Such internal conflicts among rebel groups in Syria has killed around 7,000 people there this year and complicated the three-year uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, another ally of Shia Tehran. The Islamic State also released a video called “Breaking of the Borders,” promoting its destruction of a frontier crossing between the northern province of al-Hasakah in Syria and Nineveh province in Iraq, said SITE, which tracks militant websites.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said fighting between rebel groups and their ISIL rivals is concentrated in the town of Boukamal on the border between Syria and Iraq. ISIL controls much of northeastern Syria. In Iraq, it has recently captured cities and towns as well as border crossings, effectively erasing the frontier. The group says its Islamic state stretches from northern Syria to the Iraqi province of Diyala northeast of Baghdad, and has called on all Muslims worldwide to pledge allegiance to it.

Last week, beleaguered fighters of the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, which has previously fought ISIL in opposition-held territory in northern and eastern Syria, defected and joined the Islamic State in Boukamal, effectively handing over the border town to the powerful group, which controls the Iraqi side of the crossing. Following ISIL's announcement of a caliphate, fighters in their northern Syrian stronghold of Raqqa paraded through the city to celebrate. Some revellers wore traditional robes and waved the group’s black flags in a central square, while others zoomed around in pickup trucks against a thundering backdrop of celebratory gunfire. Video of the celebrations was posted online, and activists in the city confirmed the details to Associated Press.