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Post by Admin on Jan 28, 2022 19:18:28 GMT
31 Yanagi believed that the Japanese should take a critical look at themselves with regards these questions. “I would like Koreans to know that amongst us other Japanese there are those who believe that in this affair Japan is trampling morality underfoot”.44 In the text addressed to his Korean friends he criticised “the domineering Japan”, to which he would prefer a more compassionate Japan, and wished for “humane Japanese”. He deemed the situation in Korea at the time to be “abnormal” and “unnatural”. Part of his text was censored by the authorities and its translation in a Korean‑language journal suspended.45
46 “Ushinaharentosuru Chōsen kenchiku no tame ni” 失はれんとする朝鮮建築のために (For a Korean Architecture About to (...) 47 Ibid., p. 236. 48 Ibid., p. 235. 49 Ibid., p. 236. The gate was destroyed during the Japanese invasions of the late 16th century and su (...) 50 The gate was restored to its original location in 1968, while the modern‑style Japanese building wa (...) 51 Tsurumi Shunsuke, postscript, in Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 434.
32 When the colonial government indicated its intention of destroying the Kwanghwa Gate at Kyŏngbok Palace in Seoul in order to erect an enormous modern building designed to house the new headquarters of the Government‑General, Yanagi was scandalised. What the colonisers saw as the symbolic victory of Japanese modernity over Korea’s past (the original gate had been built in 1395), Koreans saw as an attack on a symbol of their national history. Yanagi felt that the Japanese authorities were committing yet another blunder, one caused by uneducated and blind bureaucrats who knew nothing of Korea’s history and the peninsula’s nascent nationalism. In September 1922 he published an article in Kaizō on the Korean architectural treasures about to be destroyed by the Japanese. It took the form of a letter to the Kwanghwa Gate: “Kwanghwa Gate, Kwanghwa Gate, your days are now numbered. All memory of your existence in this world is soon to disappear into cold oblivion”.46 He extoled the building’s virtues, writing: “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, so magnificent in appearance”47 and possessing “tranquil beauty and dignity”. In this way, Yanagi expressed his sympathy for the Korean people who were to be deprived of a part of themselves, defended art in general and challenged the ridiculous idea of constructing a modern building “totally devoid of creative beauty” on such a historic site. He deplored the fact that no one was really able to come to the monument’s defence, and even worse, that those who opposed its destruction were accused of being conspirators.48 He did not hesitate to take his Japanese readership to task, writing “Readers, do not look down on this gate by declaring it nothing but a piece from the late Chosŏn period”.49 He also criticised a policy that showed no restraint with regards art. “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, what sorrow you must feel!” His vehemence and irony tinged with despair touched a certain number of Japanese decision‑makers, who decided to go ahead with their building but without destroying the gate, which was dismantled and rebuilt on another location.50 Yanagi was subsequently listed by the Japanese authorities as a “dangerous person”.51
52 Asakawa Noritaka 浅川伯教 (1884‑1964) was a primary school teacher in Seoul while his younger brother T (...)
33 His “discovery” of a “folk art” created by traditional craftsmen in Korea, at a time when Japan was repressing the local population, led Yanagi Sōetsu to express views that bordered on anti‑colonialism. As far as Yanagi was concerned, the fact that independence had become an ideal for Koreans was merely the inevitable consequence of the resentment they felt towards their oppressors. However, he was demoralised by his powerlessness to influence political decision‑making in Tokyo or Seoul. Along with some of his Japanese friends in Seoul who supported the Korean cause (a few did exist, such as the Asakawa brothers Noritaka and Takumi,52 who had decided to settle in Korea at the beginning of the 1910s due to their love of Korean art and crafts and who helped Yanagi to understand Korean art), he struck up friendships with Korean artists and intellectuals such as Yom Sangso and Nam Kyŏngbok, reformist nationalists who were instrumental in establishing a history of Korean literature and Korea’s popular movements. In 1924 Yanagi founded a small Museum of Korean Folk Art in Seoul, stating his ambition as being to help Koreans better understand and appreciate their own culture.
53 Kim Brandt, “Objects of Desire: Japanese Collectors and Colonial Korea”, Positions, 8‑3, Winter 200 (...)
34 Yanagi is considered by some Korean nationalists today as having promoted a kind of colonial legitimacy. They accuse him of helping to strengthen the Japanese regime in Korea by promoting Korean culture and becoming a kind of front for Japan’s “cultural policy”. Appointed by Prime Minister Hara Takashi in 1919, the new Governor‑General Saitō Makoto 斎藤実 (1858‑1936) was generally regarded as a liberal. In fact, Saitō had previously worked under Yanagi’s father and assisted Yanagi in his projects. This might go some way to explaining the assistance granted to Yanagi by certain representatives of the colonial authorities when he was attempting to set up his museum.53 Yanagi’s questionable view of the “sorrowful” aesthetics of Korean art undoubtedly has a knack for ruffling certain sensibilities in Korea today. However, his views must be considered in context and while he had his faults, he nonetheless helped promote a widely underestimated pottery. After all, where are the French aesthetes capable of founding a museum of Algerian folk art in 1920s’ Algeria?
54 See Yoshino Sakuzō, “L’affaire du massacre des Coréens” (The Korean Massacre), Ebisu, special issue (...) 55 Taishō shisō shū, book II, op. cit., p. 290.
35 A spate of pogroms erupted in September 1923 following the Great Kantō Earthquake. They mainly targeted Korean immigrants, who were killed in their thousands as the police stood by and did nothing. Yoshino Sakuzō immediately took up his pen to denounce the massacres, even going as far as showing that the police often supplied arms to the killers. His articles succeeded in touching a segment of public opinion and even some cabinet members, who demanded an end to the massacres.54 The Shinjinkai published a special issue of their journal one month after the earthquake entitled “Tanemaku hito no tachiba” 種蒔く人の立場 (The Seed Sower’s Position). They spoke of the violence “with repugnance”, writing “Try as we may, we cannot erase what happened”.55
36 Hysteria gripped the Japanese media the following year when the American House of Representatives prepared to pass a new law on immigration (the Immigration Act of 1924) that contained overtly racist and anti‑Japanese clauses. In May 1924, Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊栄 (1890‑1980), a feminist with communist leanings, denounced the anti‑Japanese movement in the United States and criticised in the name of racial equality the egoism of the Americans; however, she continued:
56 Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊栄, Jinshu teki henken, seiteki henken, kaikyū teki henken 人種的偏見、性的偏見、階級的偏見 (Racia (...) During the great earthquake and fires of San Francisco [in 1907], did the American police and army use the disaster as an excuse to openly display their anti‑Japanese sentiments and racial prejudices? Did they attempt to slaughter a large number of Japanese? Did the Japanese in America meet the same fate as the Koreans and some workers during the great earthquake last autumn [September 1923]? Do Koreans, Taiwanese and other foreign peoples living in Japan really receive the same treatment as metropolitan Japanese on a political, social and economic level? And among native Japanese, do women and workers really enjoy the same rights as everyone else, despite having–and quite rightly–the same duties? And even for the Japanese, there are far too many areas given sacred status, in which according to one’s gender, level of education or wealth, certain places are off‑limits, as if a sign at the entrance read: “no entry to those belonging to inferior groups or peoples”.56
57 Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, points out on pa (...)
37 This text, motivated by what was deemed the unacceptable attitude of the American authorities, was one of the first not only to denounce the status and condition of colonial peoples within the home islands of Japan, but also to broach the need to eradicate the widespread discrimination suffered by certain social groups. Yamakawa Kikue recognised the need to link the struggle of colonial peoples with the labour and feminist movements.57
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Post by Admin on Jan 28, 2022 21:28:45 GMT
Great or Small Japan? 58 Ishibashi Tanzan is the only Japanese prime minister whose complete works span fifteen volumes! (pu (...)
38 Among the democratic intellectuals, Ishibashi Tanzan 石橋湛山 (1884‑1973) was known for his indictment of imperialism. An advocate of “Small Japanism” (shō nippon shugi 小日本主義), Ishibashi believed, based on what he presented as rational arguments, that imperialism and colonialism cost more in the long run than they contributed to Japan, and that they encouraged the intrusive and inadvisable presence of military cliques in the main organs of state. Ishibashi Tanzan was one of the first to hold the view that expansionism was counter to democracy. In this sense, he stood in stark contrast to someone like Yoshino Sakuzō, who for many years supported the “democracy at home, imperialism abroad” doctrine. Given his post‑war career (he served as finance minister from 1946 to 1947, then as prime minister for a few weeks in 1956‑1957), Ishibashi Tanzan’s opinions clearly carried a certain weight.58
59 As pointed out by Karatani Kōjin 柄谷行人 in Richard F. Calichman (ed.), Overcoming Modernity, Columbia (...) 60 See the postscript by Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兌 (ed.), Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū 石橋湛山評論集 (The Critical (...)
39 Ishibashi Tanzan was a graduate of the Tokyo Vocational School (Tokyo Senmon Gakkō 東京専門学校, later renamed Waseda University). Having studied philosophy, he was influenced by the pragmatism of John Dewey (and in fact invented a Japanese translation of the word pragmatism: sayōshugi 作用主義). He joined the agency Tōyō, which published several newspapers, and began by writing in Tōyō Jiron 東洋時論, a magazine founded in 1910 which opposed the old moral code in the name of individualism, supported the recently formed feminist movement and criticised the imperial government’s repression of socialism. During the High Treason Incident of 1911, Tōyō Jiron, which was incensed by the death sentences handed down to the anarchists, was banned by the censors on several occasions. Soon after, Ishibashi joined the journal Tōyō Keizai Shinpō 東洋経済新報 (The Far Eastern Economic Review), despite having no real training in economics. In addition to economic and financial news, the journal also addressed political, diplomatic and social issues from a liberal standpoint. It was particularly hostile to the constant inflation of Japan’s military budgets. The preserve of Waseda graduates, Tōyō Keizai Shinpō was considered at the time to be one of the bastions of radical liberalism (kyūshinteki jiyūshugi 急進的自由主義) and in subsequent years quickly became a reference journal for its often clear‑sighted and nonconformist views. The group was headed by Miura Tetsutarō 三浦鉄太郎, Ishibashi’s mentor. Ishibashi enjoyed a glittering career with the journal, becoming one of its most outstanding journalists and finally its editor‑in‑chief. A self‑taught economist, Ishibashi Tanzan went on to become a true liberal, a follower of the thinking of Adam Smith, and also argued in favour of establishing free‑trade agreements between Japan and Korea.59 Despite being an unwavering liberal at a time of rampant state interventionism, Ishibashi was often consulted by Japanese leaders in the 1930s for his economic expertise.60
61 Beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century, individuals such as Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民 (1847‑1901 (...) 62 Miura Tetsutarō, “Dai Nipponshugi ka Shō Nipponshugi ka” 大日本主義乎小日本主義乎 (Big Japanism or Small Japani (...) 63 Ibid., p. 67.
40 In the mid‑1910s, Ishibashi Tanzan focused his criticism on Tokyo’s foreign policy and the doctrine known as “Great Japanism” (Dai Nipponshugi 大日本主義), which resulted in a desire to produce ever more arms. He advocated a different approach, that of “Small Japanism”. The idea was given to him by Miura Tetsutarō, who in 1918 wrote an article entitled “Great Japanism or Small Japanism?” in which he showed that in Great Britain, the imperial party, which championed the idea of a Greater Britain, clashed with the liberals, who favoured non‑interventionism and free trade and were opposed to colonial protectionism. Miura lamented that Japan had no political parties advocating a “Small Japan”61 and only those in favour of a Great Japan. Proponents of Great Japanism suggested that it would be impossible to increase Japan’s wealth and develop the country without overseas expansion.62 However, pointed out Miura, if this was the case, why had Japan seen no improvement in its well‑being? Why on the contrary was its standard of living falling? The truth was that expanding Japan’s territories overseas required considerable sums of money to defend, manage and develop them; a “Small Japan”, on the other hand, would allow those in power to concentrate on improving living conditions and developing popular liberties. He contrasted Great Japanism, which through overseas expansion promised increased militarism and state despotism, with Small Japanism, which through expansion conceived as a domestic phenomenon promised industrialisation, liberalism and individualism.63 However, at no point did he mention the fate of the colonial populations. Miura used statistical evidence to demonstrate the financial burden inflicted on Japan by the colonies and ultimately denounced the illusion of Great Japanism, an expression that Ishibashi would later adopt himself.
64 “Shintō wa danjite ryōyū su bekarazu” 青島は断じて領有すべからず (Qingdao Must Not Be Seized), editorial from 15 (...)
41 In 1914, Ishibashi was one of the rare individuals to clearly oppose Japan entering the war alongside the Allies and state his hostility to using the war to obtain territorial advantages or financial gain in China. Carving up China would only lead to increased conflict between the great powers, he wrote.64 His predictions became a reality the following year when Japan issued the Chinese government with its Twenty‑One Demands. He condemned the aggressive tactics of the “military cliques”, explaining that any economic and military advantages the Chinese government might be forced to concede in the short term would be wiped out in the medium term by deteriorating relations between the two countries and an inevitable increase in anti‑Japanese sentiment which, in the long run, would cost more to Japan than any advantages obtained. Unlike Kōtoku Shūsui in the 1900s or Yoshino Sakuzō, his contemporary, Ishibashi was not driven by questions of morality nor a desire to denounce the excessive aspects of a policy. He based his analysis on a purely economic calculation and an almost obsessively objective reasoning. He turned the prevailing logic at that time on its head. His argument was not that Japan should relinquish Manchuria or Qingdao in order to maintain good international relations or to please the Chinese people, but rather for the good of the Japanese nation. Eschewing mystical, imperial talk of the “national body”, or kokutai 国体, Ishibashi advocated running the state like a business, in other words, showing at least a modicum of rationality with regards Japan’s interests and paying no heed to absurd ideology. For Ishibashi, imperialism meant the easy way, mediocrity, short term and the absence of real ambition. Japan lacked a true vision of the future.
65 “Kakon o nokosu gaikō seisaku” 禍根を残す外交政策 (A Foreign Policy that the Misses the Root of the Problem) (...)
42 Japan’s policy in China was based, he added, on an incredible superiority complex displayed by the Japanese towards the Chinese:65
66 Quoted by Kano Masanao, Kindai kokka o kōsōshita shisōkatachi 近代国家を構想した思想家たち (The Thinkers Who Devi (...) The vocabulary speaks only of Sino‑Japanese friendship, China and Japan form one same people, their relationship is fraternal, like an elder brother with a younger sibling […], but in reality the Japanese have only one thing in mind: engulfing China. Friendly relations cannot be built on such a basis […]; if we truly want to establish friendly Sino‑Japanese relations, the only solution is to abandon our imperialist policy.66
43 In the aftermath of the anti‑Japanese protests that swept across Korea in 1919, and in complete contradiction with public opinion as expressed in the mainstream media at the time, Ishibashi explained why Korean independence was inevitable:
67 “Senjin bōdō ni taisuru rikai” 鮮人暴動に対する理解 (Understanding the Korean Uprising), editorial from 15 Ma (...) The Koreans are one people [ichi‑minzoku一民族]. They have their own language. They have a long independent history. Some no doubt find it regrettable, but there is not one single Korean who is glad that his country has been annexed by Japan. Until they finally regain their independence, the Koreans will naturally and repeatedly resist Japanese rule. What is more, as their knowledge and awareness increases, so their opposition to Japan will become increasingly radical.67
44 At the beginning of the 1920s Ishibashi Tanzan once again condemned the Japanese expansion on the Chinese continent which sought only economic advantages and displayed a predator‑like aggressiveness. He suggested abandoning a policy that merely generated further tension with neighbouring countries and the great powers (in particular the United States) and reiterated his support for “Small Japanism”. During the Washington Naval Conference of July 1922, he published a slew of editorials in his journal denouncing imperialism:
68 “Issai o sutsuruno kakugo. Taiheiyōkaigi ni taisuru waga taido”一切を棄つるの覚悟太平洋会議に対する我が態度 (Prepare to A (...) What if we were to relinquish Manchuria and Shandong, stop putting pressure on China, and give Korea and Taiwan back their freedom, what then would be the consequences? Britain and America would find themselves in an impossible position, unable to maintain a moral stance in the world while allowing Japan to adopt such a liberal policy alone. China and the small countries of the world would then turn to Japan and place their trust in it. India, Egypt, Persia, Haiti and the other countries dominated by the great powers would demand the same freedom that Japan had granted to Korea and Taiwan. Our country would be exalted the world over and neither Britain and America nor the other countries could do anything about it.68
69 Since 1889 the official name of Japan had been the “Empire of Great Japan” (Dai Nippon Teikoku). Th (...) 70 “Dai Nihonshugi no gensō” 大日本主義の幻想 (The Illusion of Great Japanism), editorial from 30 July 1922, r (...)
45 A few days later, he wrote an article entitled Dai Nihonshugi no gensō 大日本主義の幻想 (The Illusion of Great Japanism) in which he denounced the mediocrity of Japan’s policies and criticised all the nebulous theories proclaiming the need to constantly expand the country’s territories and permanently stoke the arms race. He ridiculed the idiotic craze for “Great Japanism” seen as a constantly expanding empire69 and extolled the economic and even political advantages of abandoning these costly dreams of grandeur. “Let us resolve to release Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, and of course relinquish China and Siberia,” he proclaimed in the introduction to this provocative text in which he argued in favour of economic logic and the right to self‑determination.70
46 After underlining the futility of the advantages implied in overseas expansionism, Ishibashi argued that the determination of colonial or subjugated populations to resist would eventually lead to the downfall of the colonial empire, just as Ireland had finally freed itself from England after a bitter struggle. Ishibashi added that it was unlikely that India would not go down this same route:
71 Ibid., p. 113. Why then should our country be alone in perpetually continuing its domination of Korea and Taiwan and preventing the Chinese and Russians from exercising their sovereignty? The Korean movement for independence, Taiwanese movement for the creation of a parliament and anti‑Japanese movements in China and Siberia, are they not already a sign of this process? I tell you that these movements will never be contained simply through police repression or army intervention. It is like believing we could use the police and army to prevent the trade union movement of workers against capitalists.71
47 Ishibashi quickly realised that independence movements were inevitable and that nothing could prevent them. “Even if Great Japanism were to provide us with some advantages, it could not be maintained for very long,” he added. Moreover, it was not even a source of revenue:
72 Ibid., p. 120. Instead of constructing barracks, let us build schools; instead of constructing warships, let us build factories. The army and navy have a budget of 800 billion yen. If we could invest just half of this amount each year in peaceful endeavours, in just a few years the face of Japan’s industry would be transformed completely.72
48 He continued further on:
73 Ibid., p. 121. Far from weakening us, abandoning Great Japanism would allow us to achieve substantial gains. If we were to relinquish territories like Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin and Manchuria, and make vast China our friend, the entire Far East and all the small and weak countries of the world would voluntarily give us their moral support. […] The essence of this strategy is harmony. Who cares what arms are developed by one or two arrogant nations? Our country—leader of a free world and supported by the hearts of Asians and the entire world— could never again be vanquished through war.73
49 Ishibashi urged Japan to strive “to morally support the small and weak countries of the world”, by which he meant all those that were not “great powers”. One senses in Ishibashi some Asianist and pacifistic impatience. An alliance between “peoples of colour”, based on real friendships and relationships of trust, was the only way to resist growing pressure from Anglo‑Saxon countries following the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Achieving this meant breaking with traditional diplomacy.
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Post by Admin on Jan 29, 2022 3:48:22 GMT
Achieving this meant breaking with traditional diplomacy.
50 In fact, in the 1920s Japan’s ruling circles felt unease at China’s growing nationalism which aspired to unify a country divided since the establishment of a republic in 1912 and which had fallen partly into the hands of warlords. The victories of the nationalist Kuomintang made them fear the emergence of a powerful state. For Japan’s imperialist circles, China’s progress towards unification was a nightmare and Ishibashi Tanzan condemned this attitude which sought to ignite a war in order to guarantee north‑eastern China’s permanent separation from the rest of the country. Ishibashi directly opposed the military operations that began in Manchuria in September 1931. A few days after the “incident” of 18 September 1931, he published a vitriolic article:
74 “Manmō mondai kaiketsu no konpon hōshin ikan” 満蒙問題解決の根本方針如何 (What Fundamental Policies would Resolv (...) There is endless talk of the “Manchurian issue”. There is indeed a way to settle this famous issue at once, and that is to restore normal friendly relations between China and Japan. It would be an excellent idea both for the two countries and for world peace.74
51 Instead of pacifying the Kuomintang leaders, Japan’s military operations would merely stoke Chinese national pride and anti‑Japanese resentment, believed Ishibashi. Whether Japan liked it or not, it would be drawn into a conflict of even graver proportions.
75 Ibid., p. 180. Just as the Japanese nation could not accept being subjected to foreign rule, so the Chinese nation cannot accept such a situation. Those in favour of Japan advancing into Manchuria are refusing the Chinese the right to think as they do. Does this not merit some self‑criticism? […] The first condition for our nation to settle the Manchurian problem is for us to simply accept China’s demand for a unified state.75
76 See Saburō Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931‑1945, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, p. 120.
52 Recognising Chinese sovereignty would challenge the idea that only the pursuit of Japan’s national interests was justified, an idea that underpinned nationalist discourse in Japan. Ishibashi added that Japan risked finding itself seriously isolated in this affair, since offending Chinese nationalist sentiment would enable them to attract the sympathy of international opinion. And Ishibashi continued in May 1932 by denouncing “the misinformation and narrow‑minded myopia causing incalculable damage to Japanese society”, in a country where “it is no longer possible to speak freely about foreign relations, the military, or anything of real importance”.76
77 Kano Masanao, Kindai Nihon shisō annai 近代日本思想案内 (Guide to Modern Japanese Thought), Iwanami Bunko, (...)
53 By taking into account the Chinese point of view in his approach to the Manchurian issue, Ishibashi provided food for thought for many young intellectuals, in particular the young sinologists of the time such as Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好, who spoke of their “Ishibashian discovery” upon reading the politician’s writings. In fact, Takeuchi Yoshimi questioned whether any Japanese at that time was capable of understanding Chinese nationalism.77
78 Ishibashi Tanzan, “Kinrai no sesō tada kotonarazu” 近来の世相ただことならず (The Political Practices of Recent (...)
54 Faced with the acts of violence committed by the military during the 1930s, Japanese parliamentarians adopted an attitude that was ambiguous to say the least, covering up the “patriotic crimes” committed in Manchuria. Ishibashi wrote in no uncertain terms that “they were making themselves complicit in murder” and that “it was as if the government was run by gangsters (bōryokudan 暴力団)”.78 For Ishibashi, the Manchurian affair was the work of ideologists driven by irrational motivations.
79 See Kurt W. Radtke, “Nationalism and Internationalism in Japan’s Economic Liberalism, The Case of I (...) 80 Quoted by Matsuo Takayoshi in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 308.
55 Ishibashi continually advocated the long term over short‑term thinking. The difficulties he foresaw for Japan on the continent have since proven him right. Having failed to correctly assess the scale of the Chinese nationalist reaction, Japan soon found itself bogged down in the country. Needless to say, the warnings issued by Ishibashi from the mid‑1910s to the early 1930s were ignored by Japanese leaders, who even at the height of the war, and despite his anti‑government leanings, consulted him regularly. In 1937 he joined the Shōwa kenkyūkai 昭和研究会, a kind of think tank for Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891‑1945)79 where he met well‑known individuals from the liberal opposition such as the philosopher Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897‑1945). However, it was clearly Ishibashi who was right about the fundamental issue: “Great Japanism” had no historical future. He spoke out against military rule and in favour of a return to a parliamentary system. In the wake of Pearl Harbor he wrote, “I am a liberal but not a traitor to the state” and criticised the constantly expanding theatre of Japan’s military operations.80 One senses his despair at seeing his country embark on a course he predicted would end in failure.
81 This was logical for him because he had been one of the first to demand that Tokyo recognise the “e (...) 82 In 1957, a minority faction within the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Ishibashi Tanzan, opposed t (...)
56 Japan’s phenomenal growth in the 1950s and 1960s proved Ishibashi right in hindsight to advocate a “Small Japan” with its development refocused on domestic growth, a far cry from the country’s imperialist dreams. The post‑war Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂 (1878‑1967) entrusted Ishibashi Tanzan with the task of rebuilding the Japanese economy by appointing him finance minister (from May 1946 to May 1947). Opposed to the economic reform advocated by the occupation authorities, in particular the dissolution of the zaibatsu, he clashed with the American authorities over his desire to reduce the costs linked to the presence of the Allied forces. Despite his muted opposition to the wartime militaristic regime, Ishibashi fell victim to the purge imposed by the Americans, who had not forgiven him for having defied them, and was forced to leave the political arena for a time. He nonetheless went on to become one of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, served as minister for international trade and industry from 1954 to 1956, pushed for relations to be restored with the USSR and communist China,81 and was finally appointed prime minister (from December 1956 to February 1957) despite staunch American opposition.82 Ill health forced him to abandon his position just two months after his nomination.
83 Tanaka Shūsei 田中秀征, Nihon Riberaru to Ishibashi Tanzan, ima seiji ga hitsuyō toshite iru koto 日本リベラ (...)
57 Ishibashi Tanzan was a pioneering and visionary spirit. In economic terms he was a liberal (but was also responsible for introducing Keynes in Japan), politically speaking he was a rather moderate democrat opposed to communism (but resolutely against military expansionism and fascism), while in the diplomatic arena he advocated “Small Japanism” (but wavered between desiring isolationism for his country or a moral role as a “global leader”). His brand of anti‑colonialism was not one of solidarity with colonial populations but rather a principled stance. When reading him today one cannot help but be struck by his invariably lucid reasoning. He never succumbed to the dominant ideas of his time. His firm belief that warmongering was never profitable for long caused him to clash with the imperialist and colonialist circles of the pre‑1945 era, which he also saw as anti‑democratic elements. His views were so lucid that some essayists have had fun imagining what Ishibashi would say about Japan today and how he would have criticised Japan’s leaders, a completely futile exercise, admittedly, but one based on a great admiration for an atypical individual.83 It is striking to note the extent to which his views in the 1920s and 1930s prefigured the Japan of the post‑war economic miracle, “an economic giant but a political dwarf”, a peaceable country whose standard of living increased steadily without intervening in the affairs of the rest of Asia.
Academic Doubts as to the Validity of Colonialism
84 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism”, in Myers and Peattie (eds.), The Japanese (...) 85 These were doubtless the first lectures given in Japan on “colonial policy” but no chair had as yet (...) 86 Chair in “colonial studies” (shokumingaku kōza 植民学講座) created at the Faculty of Agronomy. In 1910, (...) 87 Chair in “colonial policy” (shokumin seisaku kōza 植民政策講座) established within the Faculty of Law the (...)
58 Ishibashi was not the only person to develop critical economic analyses of imperialism and colonialism. In truth, the question of Japan’s colonial policy had become the subject of a debate with scientific pretensions. Beginning in 1895, the issue came under scrutiny as the first “enlightened” administrators of Taiwan believed that the solution to their problems lay in a “scientific approach” and Gotō Shinpei was keen for the new colony to serve as a “laboratory”.84 Japan’s 1905 victory over the Russians changed the country’s international status and saw it emerge as a new “great power”. Remember that this event led Japan to obtain the southern part of Sakhalin as well as leased territories on the Liaodong peninsula, establish its protectorate in Korea and exert a powerful influence in Manchuria. Consequently, in the wake of the Russo‑Japanese War the academic study of colonial policies emerged as a research topic at university and a practical and theoretical body of knowledge. As early as 1903, Nitobe Inazō, the well‑known author of Bushido, Soul of Japan, had been appointed lecturer at Kyoto Imperial University after gaining experience of colonial administration in Taiwan.85 The first university to create a chair in colonial studies was Tōhoku Imperial University in Sendai in 1907.86 Then in 1909, Nitobe was given the newly created chair at Tokyo Imperial University. Yanaihara Tadao took over the position in 1922.87 He was not yet thirty.
59 Yanaihara belonged to the Japanese Christian pacifist movement known as the Non‑Church Movement, which was closely linked to Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861‑1930), the great Christian intellectual of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who in turn was influenced by the uncompromising pacifism of Leo Tolstoy. Yanaihara Tadao professed himself impressed by Uchimura Kanzō’s uncompromising and independent nature. He was also close to leading Christian figures who had joined the moderate branch of the socialist movement, the most eminent representatives of which were Kinoshita Naoe 木下尚江 (1869‑1937) and Abe Isoo. At university he was fascinated by leading personalities Nitobe Inazō and Yoshino Sakuzō.
88 Andrew E. Barshay, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945‑90”, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed. (...)
60 In addition to the moral pacifism from which he took inspiration, Yanaihara Tadao added a brand of anti‑colonialism that was fairly radical for his time and was based on a well‑researched economic and political analysis which, as in the case of Ishibashi Tanzan, professed to be rational. He wrote for the journal Chūō Kōron and published critical writings on Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. In 1935 he produced a study on the southern islands under Japanese rule and in 1937 a work on India under British rule. As early as 1937 his radical opposition to the new war against China earned Yanaihara a professional ban that saw him dismissed from Tokyo Imperial University. He was reinstated as professor at Tokyo University after the war, in November 1945, and subsequently served as its president from 1951 to 1957. The historian of Western economics Ōtsuka Hisao 大塚久男 (1907‑1996), the post‑war leader—along with Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 (1914‑1996)—of the “modernist” school of thought, declared himself a disciple of Yanaihara, who emerged as a kind of intellectual and moral figure.88
89 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” 朝鮮統治の方針 (Policy Orientations on Korea), Chūō Kōron, June 1926, reproduced (...) 90 Ibid., p. 384. 91 Ibid., p. 390. 92 Ibid., p. 385. 93 Ibid., p. 392. The right to vote during this period followed a territorial rather than ethnic discr (...) 94 Ibid., p. 391. 61 In around 1920, Yanaihara adopted stances that were overtly hostile to the repression carried out by the government and army in Korea. A humanist and democrat, he condemned Japan’s colonial policy which impoverished Korean farmers and left them destitute, advocating instead autonomy for the colonies within the framework of the empire. In 1926, in a text published in Chūō Kōron, he demonstrated that while repression had certainly crushed the protesters of 1919, they—in other words the Korean people as a whole—had been victorious.89 Despite a desire for change, he added, the Korean people were the victims of a crippling tax policy while their lands were gradually being confiscated by Japanese settlers. This process robbed producers of their means of production and proletarianised the country, leaving the Koreans with barely enough to survive and forcing many to emigrate to Siberia, Manchuria or even, more recently, Japan itself.90 The Japanese policy of exporting rice from the peninsula to Japan forced Korean farmers to work themselves into the ground producing for the metropole while contenting themselves with meagre meals.91 A “desperate instability” was visible deep within Korean society, he wrote on several occasions.92 At this stage Yanaihara considered it natural for Koreans to be given the right to participate in the administrative and political life of their country. Specifically, this meant giving them the right to vote (the Japanese themselves had only achieved universal suffrage—for men—the previous year) by allowing them to participate in the political life of the metropole, but above all by creating a parliament in Seoul.93 “Just as the working class is able to defend its own interests sufficiently by sending its representatives to parliament, so the colonial peoples will be able to defend their interests by participating in political decision‑making”.94
95 Ibid., p. 392. 96 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” in Taishō shisō shū, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 394. 97 Quoted by Myers and Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, op. cit., p. 117.
62 Yanaihara described Japan’s colonial policy as a “despotic” regime (sensei seiji 専制政治) that did not recognise the rights of the colonised, who were treated like “uncivilised black people” (mikai kokujin 未開黒人),95 and which practised a policy of assimilation through an autonomous colonial government. And yet, he said, this regime was the product of an era: the imperialist violence and democratic demands pervading Japanese and Korean society were reflected in colonial policy orientations. He urged the Japanese parliament to exempt the colonial populations from paying further taxes and advocated liberating “those being tortured and stifled”. Japan must have the courage to face facts, he wrote.96 As for assimilation—if such a thing were even possible—, it was impracticable if it were to be carried out by a colonial administration, which in itself was an obstacle to assimilation. If Japan were to reply on such an administration, collaboration with the Koreans would quickly become impossible since their social practices resulted from a different history to that of Japan.97
98 Asada Kyōji 浅田橋二, “Yamamoto Miono no shokuminron” 山本美越乃の植民論 (Yamamoto Miono’s Theory of Colonisatio (...) 99 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin”, in Taishō shisō shū ii, op. cit., p. 393. 100 Ibid. p. 394.
63 At this stage Korean independence was not yet one of the options envisaged by Yanaihara. He advocated political autonomy for the inhabitants of the peninsula and democratic guarantees for Koreans, but little else. In this sense, his position remained similar to that of his Kyoto colleague Yamamoto Miono, who during World War I had actively supported the transformation of German possessions in the Pacific into Japanese colonies but who was opposed to assimilation and advocated self‑governance for the colonised (jichi shugi 自治主義).98 Yanaihara believed that Japan must surmount Korean resistance without alienating its population but rather by convincing them of the need for an alliance between the two peoples within the framework of the empire. Indeed, he believed that home rule was the best defence mechanism for avoiding Korean emancipation and its complete separation from Japan.99 He went even further by explaining that if as part of such a policy the Koreans were to break free and become independent, it would be a great success for Japan’s colonial policy and “the honour of the empire”.100
101 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit. In addition to the usual simplification of Chi (...) 102 Kuwabara Takeo 桑原武夫, Nihon no meicho, Kindai no shisō 日本の名著・近代の思想 (Japanese Masterpieces: Modern Th (...) 103 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by Wakabashi Masahiro, p. 339. Thi (...)
64 In a critique of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan entitled Taiwan under Imperialism, first published in 1929 and then in paperback form in 1937, Yanaihara produced what was no doubt the first serious Japanese‑language study of Taiwan written from a critical perspective.101 The fact that the author was a professor in colonial studies at Tokyo Imperial University only heightened its impact. In fact, this study of Taiwan was often seen post‑1945 as representing the starting point of Japanese area studies (chiiki kenkyu 地域研究). Kuwabara Takeo considered it a classic in Japanese social sciences and described it as “a book with great scientific rigour of which we Japanese can be proud”102. The book was banned from exportation to Taiwan upon its publication but became a bible for Taiwanese students studying in Japan, where it continued to be available in libraries and was first translated into Chinese on the continent in 1930.103 Yanaihara explained that large Japanese capitalist companies like Mitsui and Mitsubishi had monopolised the island’s industries (in particular the food‑processing and sugar‑producing industries) and that Taiwanese farmers and workers were the victims of oppression and fierce social and economic exploitation. His arguments drew on a kind of economism (similar to Marxism to be specific). Above all, and this is perhaps the main point, Yanaihara clearly specified the need to take into account the demands of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.
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Post by Admin on Feb 13, 2022 21:25:42 GMT
32When the colonial government indicated its intention of destroying the Kwanghwa Gate at Kyŏngbok Palace in Seoul in order to erect an enormous modern building designed to house the new headquarters of the Government‑General, Yanagi was scandalised. What the colonisers saw as the symbolic victory of Japanese modernity over Korea’s past (the original gate had been built in 1395), Koreans saw as an attack on a symbol of their national history. Yanagi felt that the Japanese authorities were committing yet another blunder, one caused by uneducated and blind bureaucrats who knew nothing of Korea’s history and the peninsula’s nascent nationalism. In September 1922 he published an article in Kaizō on the Korean architectural treasures about to be destroyed by the Japanese. It took the form of a letter to the Kwanghwa Gate: “Kwanghwa Gate, Kwanghwa Gate, your days are now numbered. All memory of your existence in this world is soon to disappear into cold oblivion”.46 He extoled the building’s virtues, writing: “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, so magnificent in appearance”47 and possessing “tranquil beauty and dignity”. In this way, Yanagi expressed his sympathy for the Korean people who were to be deprived of a part of themselves, defended art in general and challenged the ridiculous idea of constructing a modern building “totally devoid of creative beauty” on such a historic site. He deplored the fact that no one was really able to come to the monument’s defence, and even worse, that those who opposed its destruction were accused of being conspirators.48 He did not hesitate to take his Japanese readership to task, writing “Readers, do not look down on this gate by declaring it nothing but a piece from the late Chosŏn period”.49 He also criticised a policy that showed no restraint with regards art. “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, what sorrow you must feel!” His vehemence and irony tinged with despair touched a certain number of Japanese decision‑makers, who decided to go ahead with their building but without destroying the gate, which was dismantled and rebuilt on another location.50 Yanagi was subsequently listed by the Japanese authorities as a “dangerous person”.51
52 Asakawa Noritaka 浅川伯教 (1884‑1964) was a primary school teacher in Seoul while his younger brother T (...)
33His “discovery” of a “folk art” created by traditional craftsmen in Korea, at a time when Japan was repressing the local population, led Yanagi Sōetsu to express views that bordered on anti‑colonialism. As far as Yanagi was concerned, the fact that independence had become an ideal for Koreans was merely the inevitable consequence of the resentment they felt towards their oppressors. However, he was demoralised by his powerlessness to influence political decision‑making in Tokyo or Seoul. Along with some of his Japanese friends in Seoul who supported the Korean cause (a few did exist, such as the Asakawa brothers Noritaka and Takumi,52 who had decided to settle in Korea at the beginning of the 1910s due to their love of Korean art and crafts and who helped Yanagi to understand Korean art), he struck up friendships with Korean artists and intellectuals such as Yom Sangso and Nam Kyŏngbok, reformist nationalists who were instrumental in establishing a history of Korean literature and Korea’s popular movements. In 1924 Yanagi founded a small Museum of Korean Folk Art in Seoul, stating his ambition as being to help Koreans better understand and appreciate their own culture.
53 Kim Brandt, “Objects of Desire: Japanese Collectors and Colonial Korea”, Positions, 8‑3, Winter 200 (...)
34Yanagi is considered by some Korean nationalists today as having promoted a kind of colonial legitimacy. They accuse him of helping to strengthen the Japanese regime in Korea by promoting Korean culture and becoming a kind of front for Japan’s “cultural policy”. Appointed by Prime Minister Hara Takashi in 1919, the new Governor‑General Saitō Makoto 斎藤実 (1858‑1936) was generally regarded as a liberal. In fact, Saitō had previously worked under Yanagi’s father and assisted Yanagi in his projects. This might go some way to explaining the assistance granted to Yanagi by certain representatives of the colonial authorities when he was attempting to set up his museum.53 Yanagi’s questionable view of the “sorrowful” aesthetics of Korean art undoubtedly has a knack for ruffling certain sensibilities in Korea today. However, his views must be considered in context and while he had his faults, he nonetheless helped promote a widely underestimated pottery. After all, where are the French aesthetes capable of founding a museum of Algerian folk art in 1920s’ Algeria?
54 See Yoshino Sakuzō, “L’affaire du massacre des Coréens” (The Korean Massacre), Ebisu, special issue (...) 55 Taishō shisō shū, book II, op. cit., p. 290.
35A spate of pogroms erupted in September 1923 following the Great Kantō Earthquake. They mainly targeted Korean immigrants, who were killed in their thousands as the police stood by and did nothing. Yoshino Sakuzō immediately took up his pen to denounce the massacres, even going as far as showing that the police often supplied arms to the killers. His articles succeeded in touching a segment of public opinion and even some cabinet members, who demanded an end to the massacres.54 The Shinjinkai published a special issue of their journal one month after the earthquake entitled “Tanemaku hito no tachiba” 種蒔く人の立場 (The Seed Sower’s Position). They spoke of the violence “with repugnance”, writing “Try as we may, we cannot erase what happened”.55
36Hysteria gripped the Japanese media the following year when the American House of Representatives prepared to pass a new law on immigration (the Immigration Act of 1924) that contained overtly racist and anti‑Japanese clauses. In May 1924, Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊栄 (1890‑1980), a feminist with communist leanings, denounced the anti‑Japanese movement in the United States and criticised in the name of racial equality the egoism of the Americans; however, she continued:
56 Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊栄, Jinshu teki henken, seiteki henken, kaikyū teki henken 人種的偏見、性的偏見、階級的偏見 (Racia (...) During the great earthquake and fires of San Francisco [in 1907], did the American police and army use the disaster as an excuse to openly display their anti‑Japanese sentiments and racial prejudices? Did they attempt to slaughter a large number of Japanese? Did the Japanese in America meet the same fate as the Koreans and some workers during the great earthquake last autumn [September 1923]? Do Koreans, Taiwanese and other foreign peoples living in Japan really receive the same treatment as metropolitan Japanese on a political, social and economic level? And among native Japanese, do women and workers really enjoy the same rights as everyone else, despite having–and quite rightly–the same duties? And even for the Japanese, there are far too many areas given sacred status, in which according to one’s gender, level of education or wealth, certain places are off‑limits, as if a sign at the entrance read: “no entry to those belonging to inferior groups or peoples”.56
57 Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, points out on pa (...)
37This text, motivated by what was deemed the unacceptable attitude of the American authorities, was one of the first not only to denounce the status and condition of colonial peoples within the home islands of Japan, but also to broach the need to eradicate the widespread discrimination suffered by certain social groups. Yamakawa Kikue recognised the need to link the struggle of colonial peoples with the labour and feminist movements.57
Great or Small Japan? 58 Ishibashi Tanzan is the only Japanese prime minister whose complete works span fifteen volumes! (pu (...)
38Among the democratic intellectuals, Ishibashi Tanzan 石橋湛山 (1884‑1973) was known for his indictment of imperialism. An advocate of “Small Japanism” (shō nippon shugi 小日本主義), Ishibashi believed, based on what he presented as rational arguments, that imperialism and colonialism cost more in the long run than they contributed to Japan, and that they encouraged the intrusive and inadvisable presence of military cliques in the main organs of state. Ishibashi Tanzan was one of the first to hold the view that expansionism was counter to democracy. In this sense, he stood in stark contrast to someone like Yoshino Sakuzō, who for many years supported the “democracy at home, imperialism abroad” doctrine. Given his post‑war career (he served as finance minister from 1946 to 1947, then as prime minister for a few weeks in 1956‑1957), Ishibashi Tanzan’s opinions clearly carried a certain weight.58
59 As pointed out by Karatani Kōjin 柄谷行人 in Richard F. Calichman (ed.), Overcoming Modernity, Columbia (...) 60 See the postscript by Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兌 (ed.), Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū 石橋湛山評論集 (The Critical (...)
39Ishibashi Tanzan was a graduate of the Tokyo Vocational School (Tokyo Senmon Gakkō 東京専門学校, later renamed Waseda University). Having studied philosophy, he was influenced by the pragmatism of John Dewey (and in fact invented a Japanese translation of the word pragmatism: sayōshugi 作用主義). He joined the agency Tōyō, which published several newspapers, and began by writing in Tōyō Jiron 東洋時論, a magazine founded in 1910 which opposed the old moral code in the name of individualism, supported the recently formed feminist movement and criticised the imperial government’s repression of socialism. During the High Treason Incident of 1911, Tōyō Jiron, which was incensed by the death sentences handed down to the anarchists, was banned by the censors on several occasions. Soon after, Ishibashi joined the journal Tōyō Keizai Shinpō 東洋経済新報 (The Far Eastern Economic Review), despite having no real training in economics. In addition to economic and financial news, the journal also addressed political, diplomatic and social issues from a liberal standpoint. It was particularly hostile to the constant inflation of Japan’s military budgets. The preserve of Waseda graduates, Tōyō Keizai Shinpō was considered at the time to be one of the bastions of radical liberalism (kyūshinteki jiyūshugi 急進的自由主義) and in subsequent years quickly became a reference journal for its often clear‑sighted and nonconformist views. The group was headed by Miura Tetsutarō 三浦鉄太郎, Ishibashi’s mentor. Ishibashi enjoyed a glittering career with the journal, becoming one of its most outstanding journalists and finally its editor‑in‑chief. A self‑taught economist, Ishibashi Tanzan went on to become a true liberal, a follower of the thinking of Adam Smith, and also argued in favour of establishing free‑trade agreements between Japan and Korea.59 Despite being an unwavering liberal at a time of rampant state interventionism, Ishibashi was often consulted by Japanese leaders in the 1930s for his economic expertise.60
61 Beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century, individuals such as Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民 (1847‑1901 (...) 62 Miura Tetsutarō, “Dai Nipponshugi ka Shō Nipponshugi ka” 大日本主義乎小日本主義乎 (Big Japanism or Small Japani (...) 63 Ibid., p. 67.
40In the mid‑1910s, Ishibashi Tanzan focused his criticism on Tokyo’s foreign policy and the doctrine known as “Great Japanism” (Dai Nipponshugi 大日本主義), which resulted in a desire to produce ever more arms. He advocated a different approach, that of “Small Japanism”. The idea was given to him by Miura Tetsutarō, who in 1918 wrote an article entitled “Great Japanism or Small Japanism?” in which he showed that in Great Britain, the imperial party, which championed the idea of a Greater Britain, clashed with the liberals, who favoured non‑interventionism and free trade and were opposed to colonial protectionism. Miura lamented that Japan had no political parties advocating a “Small Japan”61 and only those in favour of a Great Japan. Proponents of Great Japanism suggested that it would be impossible to increase Japan’s wealth and develop the country without overseas expansion.62 However, pointed out Miura, if this was the case, why had Japan seen no improvement in its well‑being? Why on the contrary was its standard of living falling? The truth was that expanding Japan’s territories overseas required considerable sums of money to defend, manage and develop them; a “Small Japan”, on the other hand, would allow those in power to concentrate on improving living conditions and developing popular liberties. He contrasted Great Japanism, which through overseas expansion promised increased militarism and state despotism, with Small Japanism, which through expansion conceived as a domestic phenomenon promised industrialisation, liberalism and individualism.63 However, at no point did he mention the fate of the colonial populations. Miura used statistical evidence to demonstrate the financial burden inflicted on Japan by the colonies and ultimately denounced the illusion of Great Japanism, an expression that Ishibashi would later adopt himself.
64 “Shintō wa danjite ryōyū su bekarazu” 青島は断じて領有すべからず (Qingdao Must Not Be Seized), editorial from 15 (...)
41In 1914, Ishibashi was one of the rare individuals to clearly oppose Japan entering the war alongside the Allies and state his hostility to using the war to obtain territorial advantages or financial gain in China. Carving up China would only lead to increased conflict between the great powers, he wrote.64 His predictions became a reality the following year when Japan issued the Chinese government with its Twenty‑One Demands. He condemned the aggressive tactics of the “military cliques”, explaining that any economic and military advantages the Chinese government might be forced to concede in the short term would be wiped out in the medium term by deteriorating relations between the two countries and an inevitable increase in anti‑Japanese sentiment which, in the long run, would cost more to Japan than any advantages obtained. Unlike Kōtoku Shūsui in the 1900s or Yoshino Sakuzō, his contemporary, Ishibashi was not driven by questions of morality nor a desire to denounce the excessive aspects of a policy. He based his analysis on a purely economic calculation and an almost obsessively objective reasoning. He turned the prevailing logic at that time on its head. His argument was not that Japan should relinquish Manchuria or Qingdao in order to maintain good international relations or to please the Chinese people, but rather for the good of the Japanese nation. Eschewing mystical, imperial talk of the “national body”, or kokutai 国体, Ishibashi advocated running the state like a business, in other words, showing at least a modicum of rationality with regards Japan’s interests and paying no heed to absurd ideology. For Ishibashi, imperialism meant the easy way, mediocrity, short term and the absence of real ambition. Japan lacked a true vision of the future.
65 “Kakon o nokosu gaikō seisaku” 禍根を残す外交政策 (A Foreign Policy that the Misses the Root of the Problem) (...)
42Japan’s policy in China was based, he added, on an incredible superiority complex displayed by the Japanese towards the Chinese:65
66 Quoted by Kano Masanao, Kindai kokka o kōsōshita shisōkatachi 近代国家を構想した思想家たち (The Thinkers Who Devi (...) The vocabulary speaks only of Sino‑Japanese friendship, China and Japan form one same people, their relationship is fraternal, like an elder brother with a younger sibling […], but in reality the Japanese have only one thing in mind: engulfing China. Friendly relations cannot be built on such a basis […]; if we truly want to establish friendly Sino‑Japanese relations, the only solution is to abandon our imperialist policy.66
43In the aftermath of the anti‑Japanese protests that swept across Korea in 1919, and in complete contradiction with public opinion as expressed in the mainstream media at the time, Ishibashi explained why Korean independence was inevitable:
67 “Senjin bōdō ni taisuru rikai” 鮮人暴動に対する理解 (Understanding the Korean Uprising), editorial from 15 Ma (...) The Koreans are one people [ichi‑minzoku一民族]. They have their own language. They have a long independent history. Some no doubt find it regrettable, but there is not one single Korean who is glad that his country has been annexed by Japan. Until they finally regain their independence, the Koreans will naturally and repeatedly resist Japanese rule. What is more, as their knowledge and awareness increases, so their opposition to Japan will become increasingly radical.67
44At the beginning of the 1920s Ishibashi Tanzan once again condemned the Japanese expansion on the Chinese continent which sought only economic advantages and displayed a predator‑like aggressiveness. He suggested abandoning a policy that merely generated further tension with neighbouring countries and the great powers (in particular the United States) and reiterated his support for “Small Japanism”. During the Washington Naval Conference of July 1922, he published a slew of editorials in his journal denouncing imperialism:
68 “Issai o sutsuruno kakugo. Taiheiyōkaigi ni taisuru waga taido”一切を棄つるの覚悟太平洋会議に対する我が態度 (Prepare to A (...) What if we were to relinquish Manchuria and Shandong, stop putting pressure on China, and give Korea and Taiwan back their freedom, what then would be the consequences? Britain and America would find themselves in an impossible position, unable to maintain a moral stance in the world while allowing Japan to adopt such a liberal policy alone. China and the small countries of the world would then turn to Japan and place their trust in it. India, Egypt, Persia, Haiti and the other countries dominated by the great powers would demand the same freedom that Japan had granted to Korea and Taiwan. Our country would be exalted the world over and neither Britain and America nor the other countries could do anything about it.68
69 Since 1889 the official name of Japan had been the “Empire of Great Japan” (Dai Nippon Teikoku). Th (...) 70 “Dai Nihonshugi no gensō” 大日本主義の幻想 (The Illusion of Great Japanism), editorial from 30 July 1922, r (...) 45A few days later, he wrote an article entitled Dai Nihonshugi no gensō 大日本主義の幻想 (The Illusion of Great Japanism) in which he denounced the mediocrity of Japan’s policies and criticised all the nebulous theories proclaiming the need to constantly expand the country’s territories and permanently stoke the arms race. He ridiculed the idiotic craze for “Great Japanism” seen as a constantly expanding empire69 and extolled the economic and even political advantages of abandoning these costly dreams of grandeur. “Let us resolve to release Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, and of course relinquish China and Siberia,” he proclaimed in the introduction to this provocative text in which he argued in favour of economic logic and the right to self‑determination.70
46After underlining the futility of the advantages implied in overseas expansionism, Ishibashi argued that the determination of colonial or subjugated populations to resist would eventually lead to the downfall of the colonial empire, just as Ireland had finally freed itself from England after a bitter struggle. Ishibashi added that it was unlikely that India would not go down this same route:
71 Ibid., p. 113. Why then should our country be alone in perpetually continuing its domination of Korea and Taiwan and preventing the Chinese and Russians from exercising their sovereignty? The Korean movement for independence, Taiwanese movement for the creation of a parliament and anti‑Japanese movements in China and Siberia, are they not already a sign of this process? I tell you that these movements will never be contained simply through police repression or army intervention. It is like believing we could use the police and army to prevent the trade union movement of workers against capitalists.71
47Ishibashi quickly realised that independence movements were inevitable and that nothing could prevent them. “Even if Great Japanism were to provide us with some advantages, it could not be maintained for very long,” he added. Moreover, it was not even a source of revenue:
72 Ibid., p. 120. Instead of constructing barracks, let us build schools; instead of constructing warships, let us build factories. The army and navy have a budget of 800 billion yen. If we could invest just half of this amount each year in peaceful endeavours, in just a few years the face of Japan’s industry would be transformed completely.72
48He continued further on:
73 Ibid., p. 121.
Far from weakening us, abandoning Great Japanism would allow us to achieve substantial gains. If we were to relinquish territories like Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin and Manchuria, and make vast China our friend, the entire Far East and all the small and weak countries of the world would voluntarily give us their moral support. […] The essence of this strategy is harmony. Who cares what arms are developed by one or two arrogant nations? Our country—leader of a free world and supported by the hearts of Asians and the entire world— could never again be vanquished through war.73
49Ishibashi urged Japan to strive “to morally support the small and weak countries of the world”, by which he meant all those that were not “great powers”. One senses in Ishibashi some Asianist and pacifistic impatience. An alliance between “peoples of colour”, based on real friendships and relationships of trust, was the only way to resist growing pressure from Anglo‑Saxon countries following the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Achieving this meant breaking with traditional diplomacy.
50In fact, in the 1920s Japan’s ruling circles felt unease at China’s growing nationalism which aspired to unify a country divided since the establishment of a republic in 1912 and which had fallen partly into the hands of warlords. The victories of the nationalist Kuomintang made them fear the emergence of a powerful state. For Japan’s imperialist circles, China’s progress towards unification was a nightmare and Ishibashi Tanzan condemned this attitude which sought to ignite a war in order to guarantee north‑eastern China’s permanent separation from the rest of the country. Ishibashi directly opposed the military operations that began in Manchuria in September 1931. A few days after the “incident” of 18 September 1931, he published a vitriolic article:
74 “Manmō mondai kaiketsu no konpon hōshin ikan” 満蒙問題解決の根本方針如何 (What Fundamental Policies would Resolv (...) There is endless talk of the “Manchurian issue”. There is indeed a way to settle this famous issue at once, and that is to restore normal friendly relations between China and Japan. It would be an excellent idea both for the two countries and for world peace.74
51Instead of pacifying the Kuomintang leaders, Japan’s military operations would merely stoke Chinese national pride and anti‑Japanese resentment, believed Ishibashi. Whether Japan liked it or not, it would be drawn into a conflict of even graver proportions.
75 Ibid., p. 180.
Just as the Japanese nation could not accept being subjected to foreign rule, so the Chinese nation cannot accept such a situation. Those in favour of Japan advancing into Manchuria are refusing the Chinese the right to think as they do. Does this not merit some self‑criticism? […] The first condition for our nation to settle the Manchurian problem is for us to simply accept China’s demand for a unified state.75
76 See Saburō Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931‑1945, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, p. 120. 52Recognising Chinese sovereignty would challenge the idea that only the pursuit of Japan’s national interests was justified, an idea that underpinned nationalist discourse in Japan. Ishibashi added that Japan risked finding itself seriously isolated in this affair, since offending Chinese nationalist sentiment would enable them to attract the sympathy of international opinion. And Ishibashi continued in May 1932 by denouncing “the misinformation and narrow‑minded myopia causing incalculable damage to Japanese society”, in a country where “it is no longer possible to speak freely about foreign relations, the military, or anything of real importance”.76
77 Kano Masanao, Kindai Nihon shisō annai 近代日本思想案内 (Guide to Modern Japanese Thought), Iwanami Bunko, (...)
53By taking into account the Chinese point of view in his approach to the Manchurian issue, Ishibashi provided food for thought for many young intellectuals, in particular the young sinologists of the time such as Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好, who spoke of their “Ishibashian discovery” upon reading the politician’s writings. In fact, Takeuchi Yoshimi questioned whether any Japanese at that time was capable of understanding Chinese nationalism.77
78 Ishibashi Tanzan, “Kinrai no sesō tada kotonarazu” 近来の世相ただことならず (The Political Practices of Recent (...) 54Faced with the acts of violence committed by the military during the 1930s, Japanese parliamentarians adopted an attitude that was ambiguous to say the least, covering up the “patriotic crimes” committed in Manchuria. Ishibashi wrote in no uncertain terms that “they were making themselves complicit in murder” and that “it was as if the government was run by gangsters (bōryokudan 暴力団)”.78 For Ishibashi, the Manchurian affair was the work of ideologists driven by irrational motivations.
79 See Kurt W. Radtke, “Nationalism and Internationalism in Japan’s Economic Liberalism, The Case of I (...) 80 Quoted by Matsuo Takayoshi in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 308.
55Ishibashi continually advocated the long term over short‑term thinking. The difficulties he foresaw for Japan on the continent have since proven him right. Having failed to correctly assess the scale of the Chinese nationalist reaction, Japan soon found itself bogged down in the country. Needless to say, the warnings issued by Ishibashi from the mid‑1910s to the early 1930s were ignored by Japanese leaders, who even at the height of the war, and despite his anti‑government leanings, consulted him regularly. In 1937 he joined the Shōwa kenkyūkai 昭和研究会, a kind of think tank for Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891‑1945)79 where he met well‑known individuals from the liberal opposition such as the philosopher Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897‑1945). However, it was clearly Ishibashi who was right about the fundamental issue: “Great Japanism” had no historical future. He spoke out against military rule and in favour of a return to a parliamentary system. In the wake of Pearl Harbor he wrote, “I am a liberal but not a traitor to the state” and criticised the constantly expanding theatre of Japan’s military operations.80 One senses his despair at seeing his country embark on a course he predicted would end in failure.
81 This was logical for him because he had been one of the first to demand that Tokyo recognise the “e (...) 82 In 1957, a minority faction within the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Ishibashi Tanzan, opposed t (...)
56Japan’s phenomenal growth in the 1950s and 1960s proved Ishibashi right in hindsight to advocate a “Small Japan” with its development refocused on domestic growth, a far cry from the country’s imperialist dreams. The post‑war Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂 (1878‑1967) entrusted Ishibashi Tanzan with the task of rebuilding the Japanese economy by appointing him finance minister (from May 1946 to May 1947). Opposed to the economic reform advocated by the occupation authorities, in particular the dissolution of the zaibatsu, he clashed with the American authorities over his desire to reduce the costs linked to the presence of the Allied forces. Despite his muted opposition to the wartime militaristic regime, Ishibashi fell victim to the purge imposed by the Americans, who had not forgiven him for having defied them, and was forced to leave the political arena for a time. He nonetheless went on to become one of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, served as minister for international trade and industry from 1954 to 1956, pushed for relations to be restored with the USSR and communist China,81 and was finally appointed prime minister (from December 1956 to February 1957) despite staunch American opposition.82 Ill health forced him to abandon his position just two months after his nomination.
83 Tanaka Shūsei 田中秀征, Nihon Riberaru to Ishibashi Tanzan, ima seiji ga hitsuyō toshite iru koto 日本リベラ (...)
57Ishibashi Tanzan was a pioneering and visionary spirit. In economic terms he was a liberal (but was also responsible for introducing Keynes in Japan), politically speaking he was a rather moderate democrat opposed to communism (but resolutely against military expansionism and fascism), while in the diplomatic arena he advocated “Small Japanism” (but wavered between desiring isolationism for his country or a moral role as a “global leader”). His brand of anti‑colonialism was not one of solidarity with colonial populations but rather a principled stance. When reading him today one cannot help but be struck by his invariably lucid reasoning. He never succumbed to the dominant ideas of his time. His firm belief that warmongering was never profitable for long caused him to clash with the imperialist and colonialist circles of the pre‑1945 era, which he also saw as anti‑democratic elements. His views were so lucid that some essayists have had fun imagining what Ishibashi would say about Japan today and how he would have criticised Japan’s leaders, a completely futile exercise, admittedly, but one based on a great admiration for an atypical individual.83 It is striking to note the extent to which his views in the 1920s and 1930s prefigured the Japan of the post‑war economic miracle, “an economic giant but a political dwarf”, a peaceable country whose standard of living increased steadily without intervening in the affairs of the rest of Asia.
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Post by Admin on Feb 14, 2022 2:52:53 GMT
Academic Doubts as to the Validity of Colonialism
84 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism”, in Myers and Peattie (eds.), The Japanese (...) 85 These were doubtless the first lectures given in Japan on “colonial policy” but no chair had as yet (...) 86 Chair in “colonial studies” (shokumingaku kōza 植民学講座) created at the Faculty of Agronomy. In 1910, (...) 87 Chair in “colonial policy” (shokumin seisaku kōza 植民政策講座) established within the Faculty of Law the (...)
58Ishibashi was not the only person to develop critical economic analyses of imperialism and colonialism. In truth, the question of Japan’s colonial policy had become the subject of a debate with scientific pretensions. Beginning in 1895, the issue came under scrutiny as the first “enlightened” administrators of Taiwan believed that the solution to their problems lay in a “scientific approach” and Gotō Shinpei was keen for the new colony to serve as a “laboratory”.84 Japan’s 1905 victory over the Russians changed the country’s international status and saw it emerge as a new “great power”. Remember that this event led Japan to obtain the southern part of Sakhalin as well as leased territories on the Liaodong peninsula, establish its protectorate in Korea and exert a powerful influence in Manchuria. Consequently, in the wake of the Russo‑Japanese War the academic study of colonial policies emerged as a research topic at university and a practical and theoretical body of knowledge. As early as 1903, Nitobe Inazō, the well‑known author of Bushido, Soul of Japan, had been appointed lecturer at Kyoto Imperial University after gaining experience of colonial administration in Taiwan.85 The first university to create a chair in colonial studies was Tōhoku Imperial University in Sendai in 1907.86 Then in 1909, Nitobe was given the newly created chair at Tokyo Imperial University. Yanaihara Tadao took over the position in 1922.87 He was not yet thirty.
59Yanaihara belonged to the Japanese Christian pacifist movement known as the Non‑Church Movement, which was closely linked to Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861‑1930), the great Christian intellectual of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who in turn was influenced by the uncompromising pacifism of Leo Tolstoy. Yanaihara Tadao professed himself impressed by Uchimura Kanzō’s uncompromising and independent nature. He was also close to leading Christian figures who had joined the moderate branch of the socialist movement, the most eminent representatives of which were Kinoshita Naoe 木下尚江 (1869‑1937) and Abe Isoo. At university he was fascinated by leading personalities Nitobe Inazō and Yoshino Sakuzō.
88 Andrew E. Barshay, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945‑90”, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed. (...)
60In addition to the moral pacifism from which he took inspiration, Yanaihara Tadao added a brand of anti‑colonialism that was fairly radical for his time and was based on a well‑researched economic and political analysis which, as in the case of Ishibashi Tanzan, professed to be rational. He wrote for the journal Chūō Kōron and published critical writings on Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. In 1935 he produced a study on the southern islands under Japanese rule and in 1937 a work on India under British rule. As early as 1937 his radical opposition to the new war against China earned Yanaihara a professional ban that saw him dismissed from Tokyo Imperial University. He was reinstated as professor at Tokyo University after the war, in November 1945, and subsequently served as its president from 1951 to 1957. The historian of Western economics Ōtsuka Hisao 大塚久男 (1907‑1996), the post‑war leader—along with Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 (1914‑1996)—of the “modernist” school of thought, declared himself a disciple of Yanaihara, who emerged as a kind of intellectual and moral figure.88
89 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” 朝鮮統治の方針 (Policy Orientations on Korea), Chūō Kōron, June 1926, reproduced (...) 90 Ibid., p. 384. 91 Ibid., p. 390. 92 Ibid., p. 385. 93 Ibid., p. 392. The right to vote during this period followed a territorial rather than ethnic discr (...) 94 Ibid., p. 391.
61In around 1920, Yanaihara adopted stances that were overtly hostile to the repression carried out by the government and army in Korea. A humanist and democrat, he condemned Japan’s colonial policy which impoverished Korean farmers and left them destitute, advocating instead autonomy for the colonies within the framework of the empire. In 1926, in a text published in Chūō Kōron, he demonstrated that while repression had certainly crushed the protesters of 1919, they—in other words the Korean people as a whole—had been victorious.89 Despite a desire for change, he added, the Korean people were the victims of a crippling tax policy while their lands were gradually being confiscated by Japanese settlers. This process robbed producers of their means of production and proletarianised the country, leaving the Koreans with barely enough to survive and forcing many to emigrate to Siberia, Manchuria or even, more recently, Japan itself.90 The Japanese policy of exporting rice from the peninsula to Japan forced Korean farmers to work themselves into the ground producing for the metropole while contenting themselves with meagre meals.91 A “desperate instability” was visible deep within Korean society, he wrote on several occasions.92 At this stage Yanaihara considered it natural for Koreans to be given the right to participate in the administrative and political life of their country. Specifically, this meant giving them the right to vote (the Japanese themselves had only achieved universal suffrage—for men—the previous year) by allowing them to participate in the political life of the metropole, but above all by creating a parliament in Seoul.93 “Just as the working class is able to defend its own interests sufficiently by sending its representatives to parliament, so the colonial peoples will be able to defend their interests by participating in political decision‑making”.94
95 Ibid., p. 392. 96 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” in Taishō shisō shū, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 394. 97 Quoted by Myers and Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, op. cit., p. 117.
62Yanaihara described Japan’s colonial policy as a “despotic” regime (sensei seiji 専制政治) that did not recognise the rights of the colonised, who were treated like “uncivilised black people” (mikai kokujin 未開黒人),95 and which practised a policy of assimilation through an autonomous colonial government. And yet, he said, this regime was the product of an era: the imperialist violence and democratic demands pervading Japanese and Korean society were reflected in colonial policy orientations. He urged the Japanese parliament to exempt the colonial populations from paying further taxes and advocated liberating “those being tortured and stifled”. Japan must have the courage to face facts, he wrote.96 As for assimilation—if such a thing were even possible—, it was impracticable if it were to be carried out by a colonial administration, which in itself was an obstacle to assimilation. If Japan were to reply on such an administration, collaboration with the Koreans would quickly become impossible since their social practices resulted from a different history to that of Japan.97
98 Asada Kyōji 浅田橋二, “Yamamoto Miono no shokuminron” 山本美越乃の植民論 (Yamamoto Miono’s Theory of Colonisatio (...) 99 “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin”, in Taishō shisō shū ii, op. cit., p. 393. 100 Ibid. p. 394.
63At this stage Korean independence was not yet one of the options envisaged by Yanaihara. He advocated political autonomy for the inhabitants of the peninsula and democratic guarantees for Koreans, but little else. In this sense, his position remained similar to that of his Kyoto colleague Yamamoto Miono, who during World War I had actively supported the transformation of German possessions in the Pacific into Japanese colonies but who was opposed to assimilation and advocated self‑governance for the colonised (jichi shugi 自治主義).98 Yanaihara believed that Japan must surmount Korean resistance without alienating its population but rather by convincing them of the need for an alliance between the two peoples within the framework of the empire. Indeed, he believed that home rule was the best defence mechanism for avoiding Korean emancipation and its complete separation from Japan.99 He went even further by explaining that if as part of such a policy the Koreans were to break free and become independent, it would be a great success for Japan’s colonial policy and “the honour of the empire”.100
101 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit. In addition to the usual simplification of Chi (...) 102 Kuwabara Takeo 桑原武夫, Nihon no meicho, Kindai no shisō 日本の名著・近代の思想 (Japanese Masterpieces: Modern Th (...) 103 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by Wakabashi Masahiro, p. 339. Thi (...)
64In a critique of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan entitled Taiwan under Imperialism, first published in 1929 and then in paperback form in 1937, Yanaihara produced what was no doubt the first serious Japanese‑language study of Taiwan written from a critical perspective.101 The fact that the author was a professor in colonial studies at Tokyo Imperial University only heightened its impact. In fact, this study of Taiwan was often seen post‑1945 as representing the starting point of Japanese area studies (chiiki kenkyu 地域研究). Kuwabara Takeo considered it a classic in Japanese social sciences and described it as “a book with great scientific rigour of which we Japanese can be proud”102. The book was banned from exportation to Taiwan upon its publication but became a bible for Taiwanese students studying in Japan, where it continued to be available in libraries and was first translated into Chinese on the continent in 1930.103 Yanaihara explained that large Japanese capitalist companies like Mitsui and Mitsubishi had monopolised the island’s industries (in particular the food‑processing and sugar‑producing industries) and that Taiwanese farmers and workers were the victims of oppression and fierce social and economic exploitation. His arguments drew on a kind of economism (similar to Marxism to be specific). Above all, and this is perhaps the main point, Yanaihara clearly specified the need to take into account the demands of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.
104 Prior to the arrival of the Japanese, the population of Taiwan had consisted partly of local popula (...) 105 Yanaihara Tadao, ibid., p. 26.
65Yanaihara began by recounting the history of Formosa—the Beautiful Island—which was fought over by the Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese during the seventeenth century. The Chinese were victorious but in the nineteenth century the island once again became an object of desire for the Prussians, Americans and French before the Japanese finally seized Taiwan after it was ceded to Tokyo by Beijing at the end of the Sino‑Japanese War.104 Yanaihara took the opportunity to re‑examine the Sino‑Japanese War of 1894‑1895, which he presented not as “a national war”, as official propaganda would have it, but as “an imperialist war”.105
106 Ibid., p. 25. 107 Ibid., p. 23. 108 Ibid., p. 245.
66In Japan circa 1895, where industrial capitalism was still in its infancy, imperialism as an ideology had already firmly taken root.106 In fact, the occupation of Taiwan had cost more to Japan than any profits generated, and Yanaihara deemed this a “luxury expenditure” that the Japanese state had permitted itself in pursuit of a questionable strategic vision.107 By seizing Taiwan in order to avoid it falling into the hands of the other great powers, Japan had for the first time adopted a clearly imperialist attitude. Yet this outcome had been in no way unavoidable. Yanaihara’s criticism, however, just like that of Ishibashi, focused on the consequences: namely (public) expenditure higher than (private) profits, and a deterioration in Japan’s symbolic image in the region. Ultimately, Yanaihara questioned what price Japan would have obtained for Taiwan had it sold the island off and invested the money into the national economy.108 Though he did not employ the expression “Small Japan”, Yanaihara’s stance here resembled the views put forward by Ishibashi Tanzan.
109 Ibid., p. 316. 110 Kuwabara Takeo, Nihon no meicho, Kindai no shisō, op. cit., writes on p. 246 that in around 1929, w (...) 111 Ibid., p. 304, and p. 317 in particular.
67Yanaihara also criticised “the exacerbated level of colonial despotism that has rarely been equalled in other colonial experiments around the world,”109 he wrote, not without exaggeration but no doubt a little too quickly.110 However, the brutality of the colonial endeavour, combined incidentally with significant public investments, did eventually produce undeniable results, particularly in the field of sanitation, infrastructure and transport. Moreover, these successes made political reforms unavoidable, since without these opposition to the island’s Japanisation would continue to grow. He concluded that the development of colonial imperialism was contradictory, that it was racing towards its own downfall as it were.111
68Yanaihara was generally opposed to assimilationist policies, believing that with the weak democracy and authoritarian practices of the metropole, the Japanese lot was not so enviable. However, beyond the two colonies’ historical differences, the problems of Taiwan and Korea were identical. Political rights enabling self‑governance should be extended to the colonial populations. And if they were to demand their independence, it should be granted, thought Yanaihara, for they would then necessarily maintain friendly, peaceful relations with the former metropole. Thus, there was ultimately nothing to be lost in the colonies achieving independence, as long as the process took place peacefully. Yanaihara’s views on traditional Japanese policies were thus extremely critical. He displayed a fairly radical reformism but never went as far as suggesting the severing of relations between metropole and colonies.
112 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by Wakabashi Masahiro, p. 347. 113 Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by Wakabashi Masahiro, p. 351. Des (...) 114 The first issue of Akahata 赤旗 (Red Flag), the underground newspaper of the Japanese Communist Party (...) 115 Yamakawa Hitoshi, Shokumin seisakuka no Taiwan, op. cit. 116 Itō Teruo, Ajia to Kindai Nihon, Hanshinryaku no shisō to undō, op. cit., p. 142‑148. 69Incidentally, these views earned him criticism from followers of Marxism. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1921), Lenin was one of the first to explicitly establish a link between imperialism and colonialism, but his analysis was little known in Japan prior to the early 1920s. Yanaihara is known to have discussed Lenin’s work in his lectures.112 One of his former colleagues at the Faculty of Economics, Hosokawa Karoku 細川嘉六 (1888‑1962), who worked at the Ōhara Institute for Social Research (Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 大原社会問題研究所), openly questioned the contradiction inherent in Yanaihara’s position, in which “one could not help but defend the interests of the capitalist class” and be the spokesperson for a system, and he voiced doubts as to the scientific nature of such teachings.113 Later, in 1932‑1933, followers of the Kōza school of Marxism developed a radical criticism of colonialism, seen as inextricably linked to capitalism and imperialism, in their “Lectures on the Development of Japanese Capitalism” (Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi kōza 日本資本主義発達史講座). However, their view of colonialism as being an epiphenomenon of imperialism meant that they failed to propose a specific critical analysis of a system they believed would collapse by itself with Japan’s revolution to come.114 The only person to have attempted a Marxist analysis of the situation in Taiwan, including a radical criticism of colonialism, is Yamakawa Hitoshi山川均 (1880‑1958), one of the founding members of the Japanese Communist Party.115 According to him, the colony became profitable in 1908 following a difficult start. It was thus a success, but for whom? Not for the colonial populations subjected to economic exploitation coupled with harsh political rule. He pointed to the confiscation of land by the sugar and paper industries, which were controlled entirely by mainland capital and benefitted from the political support of the colonial administration, as well as pay discrimination between colonists and colonised. He also explained how the issuing of a special law, known as Title 63, allowed the governor‑general to behave like a “despotic sovereign” and how the transition to a civil administration as of 1920 had not really changed anything since the repressive public order laws remained in force. He came down in favour of a growing democratic movement in Taiwan and called for equal rights between colonial peoples and metropolitan Japanese, but ultimately voiced concerns about the fundamental indifference of working‑class Japanese vis‑à‑vis the situation in the colonies.116
70Though Yanaihara adopted several aspects of Yamakawa Hitoshi’s Marxist economic analysis in his study, he never adhered to communist values. Rather than simply providing a critical review of colonial policies, Yanaihara proposed undertaking research in the form of concrete fieldwork on colonial societies. In fact, with its combination of history, politics, sociology, education and economic analysis, there was an undeniably multidisciplinary dimension to his work. Indeed, it is in this sense that he may be considered a pioneer in the study of culture areas.
117 “Manshū mondai” 満州問題 (The Manchurian Problem), in Yanaihara Tadao zenshū 矢内原忠雄全集 (The Complete Work (...)
71A few months after the military intervention in Manchuria in September 1931, Yanaihara wrote an article which he later reprised in The Manchurian Problem.117 In an effort to understand the situation in Manchuria, Yanaihara traced the imperialist rivalries that had existed in the region since the early twentieth century and described the causes of the anti‑Japanese protests in China, which he presented on the one hand as “a historical necessity”, given the economic and political development of China and Manchuria, and on the other hand as a “nationalist movement”. In his eyes, this anti‑Japanese nationalist movement was deeply rooted and probably impossible to contain. The idea of protecting Japan’s special interests and privileges in China would only lead to a clash with Chinese nationalism, a movement he considered to be in the ascendant. Given these circumstances, Japan’s policy in Manchuria could only lead to a worsening of the situation. This conviction led him to refute the colonialist discourses justifying Japan’s presence in the region which drew on three economic arguments: emigration, profits from trade and the idea of a Japanese‑Manchurian trade bloc.
72Japanese farmers emigrating to Manchuria would not solve the problem of overpopulation in the metropole, explained Yanaihara. Driven out by the poverty in Japan, the colonists he likened to emigrants found themselves in a difficult situation with significant set‑up costs and, for the government, running costs to maintain public order and supply a market that cost more than it made. The Japanese invasion severed traditional trade links between China and Manchuria and disrupted economic channels. These channels were rebuilt with Japan, but the structural weakness of Manchuria’s domestic market carried very little weight in Japan’s foreign trade, barely more than 5 to 10%, which was nothing compared to the costs incurred in controlling the area and maintaining order. Added to this was the rapid deterioration in relations with China due to Japan having taken control of Manchuria. As early as 1932, Yanaihara forecast a second Sino‑Japanese War, which indeed broke out in 1937. Lastly, was it feasible to create a self‑sufficient Japan‑Manchuria economic bloc, as advocated in certain circles, and would it really be effective? The idea was to tap into Manchuria’s vast reserves of raw materials, but as Yanaihara explained, despite their abundance these resources were insufficient for an economy like that of Japan. Furthermore, they were often of inferior quality or unprofitable to extract. Yanaihara concluded that when considered solely from the perspective of its overall profitability, Japan’s occupation of Manchuria was a grave and costly economic error. It would provide only short term gains, he explained, and only to the capitalists who had invested in the region. Graver yet, it implied a difficult war with China that would cost Japan much more than the occupation of Manchuria would ever yield and whose outcome was uncertain.
118 “Teikoku shugi kenkyū” 帝国主義研究 (A Study of Imperialism), in Yanaihara Tadao zenshū, op. cit., volume (...)
73Under the guise of a political analysis, Yanaihara proceeded to criticise the imperialist arguments that abounded in the press at that time. Economically speaking, colonisation was futile. Worse still, wanting to politically engineer the prosperity of the Japanese nation through the oppression of the Chinese nation, itself under construction, indicated a complete lack of understanding of the political and social movements sweeping Asia since the beginning of the century. Japan’s designs were virtually guaranteed to fail, he wrote. “Conversely, if Japan were to acknowledge China’s desire to create a unified state and help it achieve this goal, it would be helping itself as well as contributing to peace in Asia”.118
74Linking on from this, the question of morality was also raised. Was the invasion right? The answer was no, and this for reasons of principle:
119 Yanaihara Tadao, “Kirisuto kyō ni okeru heiwa no risō” (The Peace Ideal in Christianity), in Kirisu (...) It is right to oppose the invasion [of Manchuria by Japan]. It is right to not provoke a war for that. Justice demands, by means other than war, that the invasion be stopped. The aim of justice is to prevent war and punish those who began the invasion. And the path taken by justice can only lead towards peace.119
120 Narita Ryūichi, Taishō demokurashii, op. cit., p. 151.
75Ishibashi Tanzan and Yanaihara Tadao were both respected personalities and opinion leaders in their time. But they were not alone. In fact, incidentally, it is interesting to note that the majority of teachers at the imperial universities in charge of analysing colonial societies were opposed to the brutal colonialist policies developed by the various Japanese governments. In an article published in Taiyō in May 1920, Yamamoto Miono, who taught colonial policy at Kyoto University, argued for a local administration run by the Koreans themselves and for deputies representing the colonial minorities in the Japanese Diet. Others, on the contrary, supported an assimilationist policy in the name of democracy. This was notably the case of Uehara Etsujirō 上原悦二郎 (1877‑1962), who dreamed of a Japan in which the democratic revolution had been achieved and which would be capable of assimilating a democratised Korea in order to build a common nation free of discrimination.120
121 Ibid., p. 152.
76The anti‑repressive and reformist colonialism of Japanese democrats from the 1920s and 1930s may seem outdated today. But make no mistake about it: rare were those at the time in Great Britain and France, for example, who expressed such clear condemnation of colonial injustice. From this point of view, the Japanese critics of Japanese colonialism were quite remarkable. Moreover, radical advocates of independence were a minority in the Japanese colonies at that time. Indeed, a certain section of Korean and Taiwanese nationalists sincerely believed—just like the Japanese democrats—that the colonial system could be reformed. So it was that Tagawa Daikichirō, a deputy and advocate of “imperial democracy” as conceived by Yoshino Sakuzō, came to present to the Japanese Diet a Taiwanese petition for the creation of a parliament in Taipei. It was signed by Taiwanese who presented themselves as “Japanese nationals who also aspire to democracy”. Similar petitions were presented in Tokyo on numerous occasions. Similarly, as early as 1920, petitions of this type calling for a law to make Koreans eligible for election circulated in Korea. The right to participate in public life was a fundamental aspiration for local Taiwanese and Korean elites. Taking Japanese assimilationists literally, they declared themselves to be “Japanese” or “nationals” and as such called on the Japanese authorities in the colonies or the home islands to grant them representation in the capital.121
77In some ways it could be said that Taiwanese and Korean nationalists were themselves caught up in the wave of democracy that swept through Japan as of 1918, that they played an active role in it and that they demanded greater democracy and autonomy in their own countries as well as in the metropole. A convergence began to emerge between Japanese liberals and democrats and local elites in the colonial societies in order to fight the brutal and repressive systems established by the colonial government.
122 Nishikawa Nagao 西川長夫, Shin Shokuminchishugiron Gurobaruka jidai no shokuminchishugi o tou 〈新〉植民地主義論(...)
78In a Japan where expansionists were in the majority, those voicing criticism of colonialism ultimately remained limited in number. Despite hailing from the intellectual elite, these voices received little attention from the upper echelons of the government where militarist and imperialist influences were too strong. The more influential these factions were, the more difficult or even impossible it became to voice criticism. But let us not imagine that anti‑colonial movements wielded much influence in Western colonial metropoles before the Second World War either. More often than not, it was the proportions anti‑colonial movements took on in the colonies themselves after the war that in turn brought home the reality of colonialism to metropolitan populations. Japan’s anti‑colonial movements were never able to gain momentum because decolonisation came about suddenly, as it were, with Japan’s military defeat in August‑September 1945. After all, France did not lose its colonial empire upon its defeat in 1940. Yet after 1945, Japan found itself if not colonised, at the very least defeated and subjected to the presence of the United States Army on its own soil. This is the paradox of a country forced to deprive anti‑colonial discourse of all pertinence after 1945. As pointed out by Nishikawa Nagao, the post‑war Japanese saw themselves both as former colonisers with regards their former territories and as a colonised or semi‑colonised people by the United States. He describes the mind‑sets that emerged at the time, turning the Japanese into a people “colonised from the inside”.122
123 Claude Liauzu, Histoire de l’anticolonialisme en France (The History of Anti‑colonialism in France) (...)
79Incisive criticism of the colonial regime was voiced prior to decolonisation, albeit by a minority. From this point of view, the movement within Japanese society was not out of step with Western countries. Indeed, those clearly expressing anti‑colonialist views in Western colonial metropoles prior to the 1930s were few in number. Claude Liauzu speaks of the “marginality of anti‑colonialism” in pre‑war France.123 This ability of certain Japanese critics to rise above the fray and warn of the looming disaster shows, if it needed repeating, the discernment and lucidity of one section of “civil society” in Japan. It also suggests certain continuities—beyond the period of militarism and war—between liberal and democratic policies before and after the war.
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