Post by Admin on Feb 6, 2019 17:35:50 GMT
The Americans drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
Stalin returned to Moscow on the evening of August 5. His appointment log for August 5 shows that immediately after his arrival at the Kremlin, he frantically resumed activities, meeting his top advisers.53 Then the shocking news reached Moscow. The Americans had dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima at 8:15 Hiroshima time (0:15 Moscow time) on August 6.
The news seems to have crushed Stalin. Pravda did not report anything about the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 7, and only on August 8 did it report Truman’s statement on the atomic bomb in a lower column on page 4 without comment.54 Stalin’s appointment log for his Kremlin office shows that he did not see anyone on August 6 in the Kremlin, although we do not know about possible meetings at his dacha. It is possible to assume that Stalin was devastated by the news, believing that the game was over, that Japan would surrender, and that the Americans had won.55 On the afternoon of August 7, Molotov was at the airport to meet the Chinese delegation headed by T.V. Soong. He was in a dejected mood, and told Soong that Japan was on the verge of collapse.56 This represented the mood of the Soviet leadership after the Hiroshima bomb.
Soviets declare war on Japan
Contrary to Truman’s expectations, however, the atomic bombing on Hiroshima did not immediately lead to Japan’s decision to surrender. On August 7, one day after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Togo sent another urgent telegram to seek an immediate appointment with Molotov to obtain Moscow’s answer regarding the Konoe mission.57 This meant that despite the Hiroshima bomb, Japan continued to rely on Moscow’s mediation.
Sato’s request to meet Molotov came sometime in the afternoon. Stalin immediately leapt to action. At 4:30 p.m. he ordered Vasilevskii to begin the Manchurian operation the next day at midnight on August 9, Chita time (6 p.m. August 8 Moscow time), thus moving up the date of attack by forty-eight hours. Accordingly, Vasilevskii instantly issued four directives between 10:35 and 11:10 Chita time (4:35 to 5:10 Moscow time), each ordering all forces on the three fronts and the Pacific Fleet to begin operations at 6 p.m. Moscow time on August 8.58 T.V. Soong was surprised to learn that Stalin wanted to start the negotiations right away without giving the Chinese delegation any time to rest. At the late night meeting, however, the differences did not narrow. Stalin then decided to enter the war without any agreement with the Chinese.59
A few minutes after 3 p.m. Washington time, Truman held a news conference at the White House. He read a terse statement to the reporters, announcing that the Soviet Union had declared war against Japan.61 Things had not gone according to his timetable. After Truman’s short announcement, Byrnes released a statement to the press. Ostensibly welcoming Soviet entry into the war, he stated that at the Potsdam Conference, the president had conveyed to Stalin that Soviet participation in the war would be justified on the basis of Paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration and Articles 103 and 106 of the United Nations Charter.62 Byrnes’ statement was an indirect and underhanded way to repudiate the Soviet claim that the Allies had invited the Soviet Union to join the Potsdam Proclamation.
Japan accepts surrender
The whole purpose of the Soviet Far Eastern Campaign was to physically occupy the territories promised at Yalta. The Soviets, with 1.5 million men, converged on Manchuria from three directions with astonishing speed. The Soviet attack shocked the Japanese policymakers, who had pinned their last hope to end the war on Soviet mediation. The Supreme War Council, which had not been called even after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, was immediately summoned after the Soviet invasion. Nevertheless, the Japanese government still remained divided between those who advocated immediate surrender with only one condition, i.e., the preservation of the emperor system [kokutai] and those who insisted on other conditions. The second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki when the Supreme War Council was in the middle of heated discussion, but the second atomic bomb had no influence on the outcome of the discussion. Finally, it took the emperor’s unprecedented intervention on behalf of accepting the terms specified in the Potsdam Proclamation, with the sole condition that the imperial prerogatives would not be touched.63
The US government rejected Japan’s conditional surrender, and presented the Byrnes Note to Japan, which stipulated that the emperor and the Japanese government would be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and that the ultimate form of the government would be determined by the Japanese people. To Truman’s surprise, Moscow promptly accepted the Byrnes Note. Stalin was pleased with US rejection of Japan’s conditional surrender offer, since it gave the Soviet troops more time to expand the territory under Soviet occupation.64
Stalin also gambled on the Chinese response. He expected the Soviet advance deep into Manchuria would induce the Chinese to make concessions for fear that the Soviet influence in Manchuria would lead to the establishment of a communist regime in Manchuria. He won the gamble. The Chinese finally came around to an agreement on August 15, three hours after Japan announced its unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms.65
Thus, the Soviet entry into the war was decisive for Japan’s decision to surrender, with greater influence than the two atomic bombs combined. The Soviet entry into the war dashed any hope of terminating the war through Moscow’s mediation. In addition, the Soviet Army’s quick advance into Manchuria instilled fear among Japan’s highest policymakers that to prolong the war would enhance the possibilities of the Soviets insinuating themselves into occupation policy, endangering the dynasty.66
Stalin returned to Moscow on the evening of August 5. His appointment log for August 5 shows that immediately after his arrival at the Kremlin, he frantically resumed activities, meeting his top advisers.53 Then the shocking news reached Moscow. The Americans had dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima at 8:15 Hiroshima time (0:15 Moscow time) on August 6.
The news seems to have crushed Stalin. Pravda did not report anything about the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 7, and only on August 8 did it report Truman’s statement on the atomic bomb in a lower column on page 4 without comment.54 Stalin’s appointment log for his Kremlin office shows that he did not see anyone on August 6 in the Kremlin, although we do not know about possible meetings at his dacha. It is possible to assume that Stalin was devastated by the news, believing that the game was over, that Japan would surrender, and that the Americans had won.55 On the afternoon of August 7, Molotov was at the airport to meet the Chinese delegation headed by T.V. Soong. He was in a dejected mood, and told Soong that Japan was on the verge of collapse.56 This represented the mood of the Soviet leadership after the Hiroshima bomb.
Soviets declare war on Japan
Contrary to Truman’s expectations, however, the atomic bombing on Hiroshima did not immediately lead to Japan’s decision to surrender. On August 7, one day after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Togo sent another urgent telegram to seek an immediate appointment with Molotov to obtain Moscow’s answer regarding the Konoe mission.57 This meant that despite the Hiroshima bomb, Japan continued to rely on Moscow’s mediation.
Sato’s request to meet Molotov came sometime in the afternoon. Stalin immediately leapt to action. At 4:30 p.m. he ordered Vasilevskii to begin the Manchurian operation the next day at midnight on August 9, Chita time (6 p.m. August 8 Moscow time), thus moving up the date of attack by forty-eight hours. Accordingly, Vasilevskii instantly issued four directives between 10:35 and 11:10 Chita time (4:35 to 5:10 Moscow time), each ordering all forces on the three fronts and the Pacific Fleet to begin operations at 6 p.m. Moscow time on August 8.58 T.V. Soong was surprised to learn that Stalin wanted to start the negotiations right away without giving the Chinese delegation any time to rest. At the late night meeting, however, the differences did not narrow. Stalin then decided to enter the war without any agreement with the Chinese.59
A few minutes after 3 p.m. Washington time, Truman held a news conference at the White House. He read a terse statement to the reporters, announcing that the Soviet Union had declared war against Japan.61 Things had not gone according to his timetable. After Truman’s short announcement, Byrnes released a statement to the press. Ostensibly welcoming Soviet entry into the war, he stated that at the Potsdam Conference, the president had conveyed to Stalin that Soviet participation in the war would be justified on the basis of Paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration and Articles 103 and 106 of the United Nations Charter.62 Byrnes’ statement was an indirect and underhanded way to repudiate the Soviet claim that the Allies had invited the Soviet Union to join the Potsdam Proclamation.
Japan accepts surrender
The whole purpose of the Soviet Far Eastern Campaign was to physically occupy the territories promised at Yalta. The Soviets, with 1.5 million men, converged on Manchuria from three directions with astonishing speed. The Soviet attack shocked the Japanese policymakers, who had pinned their last hope to end the war on Soviet mediation. The Supreme War Council, which had not been called even after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, was immediately summoned after the Soviet invasion. Nevertheless, the Japanese government still remained divided between those who advocated immediate surrender with only one condition, i.e., the preservation of the emperor system [kokutai] and those who insisted on other conditions. The second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki when the Supreme War Council was in the middle of heated discussion, but the second atomic bomb had no influence on the outcome of the discussion. Finally, it took the emperor’s unprecedented intervention on behalf of accepting the terms specified in the Potsdam Proclamation, with the sole condition that the imperial prerogatives would not be touched.63
The US government rejected Japan’s conditional surrender, and presented the Byrnes Note to Japan, which stipulated that the emperor and the Japanese government would be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and that the ultimate form of the government would be determined by the Japanese people. To Truman’s surprise, Moscow promptly accepted the Byrnes Note. Stalin was pleased with US rejection of Japan’s conditional surrender offer, since it gave the Soviet troops more time to expand the territory under Soviet occupation.64
Stalin also gambled on the Chinese response. He expected the Soviet advance deep into Manchuria would induce the Chinese to make concessions for fear that the Soviet influence in Manchuria would lead to the establishment of a communist regime in Manchuria. He won the gamble. The Chinese finally came around to an agreement on August 15, three hours after Japan announced its unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms.65
Thus, the Soviet entry into the war was decisive for Japan’s decision to surrender, with greater influence than the two atomic bombs combined. The Soviet entry into the war dashed any hope of terminating the war through Moscow’s mediation. In addition, the Soviet Army’s quick advance into Manchuria instilled fear among Japan’s highest policymakers that to prolong the war would enhance the possibilities of the Soviets insinuating themselves into occupation policy, endangering the dynasty.66