Post by Admin on Aug 30, 2024 0:29:16 GMT
Ukraine’s recent advances in the Kursk region of Russia illustrate the difficulty of turning the tide of the war. Ukraine attacked an unusually ill-prepared section of the Russian front, which enabled Ukrainian forces to take ground quickly. But as Russian reserves have arrived, the Ukrainian advance has slowed, and it appears unlikely that Ukraine will make any major breakthrough. The modest seizure of Russian territory may strengthen Ukraine’s bargaining position in negotiations, ease Russian pressure on Ukrainian defenses in the Donbas, or weaken Russian President Vladimir Putin politically, but it is unlikely to change the military picture in a significant way.
From a strictly military perspective, restrictions never help. Giving Ukraine the means and permission to launch attacks deep into Russian-held territory would surely improve Ukrainian combat power. But the difference is unlikely to be decisive. To achieve a game-changing effect, Ukraine would need to combine these strikes with tightly coordinated ground maneuver on a scale that its forces have been unable to master so far in this war. Otherwise, the benefits Ukraine could draw from additional deep strike capability would probably not be enough to turn the tide.
The conflict in Ukraine has been a war of attrition for more than a year now. Both sides have adopted the kind of deep, prepared defenses that historically have proved very difficult to break through. It is still possible to take ground, especially for the numerically superior Russians, but progress is slow and costly in both lives and materiel. Ukraine would need far more than modest improvements in capability to overcome Russian defenses and turn the present war of position into a war of maneuver, in which ground can be gained quickly, at tolerable cost, and on a large scale.
From a strictly military perspective, restrictions never help. Giving Ukraine the means and permission to launch attacks deep into Russian-held territory would surely improve Ukrainian combat power. But the difference is unlikely to be decisive. To achieve a game-changing effect, Ukraine would need to combine these strikes with tightly coordinated ground maneuver on a scale that its forces have been unable to master so far in this war. Otherwise, the benefits Ukraine could draw from additional deep strike capability would probably not be enough to turn the tide.
The conflict in Ukraine has been a war of attrition for more than a year now. Both sides have adopted the kind of deep, prepared defenses that historically have proved very difficult to break through. It is still possible to take ground, especially for the numerically superior Russians, but progress is slow and costly in both lives and materiel. Ukraine would need far more than modest improvements in capability to overcome Russian defenses and turn the present war of position into a war of maneuver, in which ground can be gained quickly, at tolerable cost, and on a large scale.
