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Post by Admin on Feb 4, 2019 4:18:22 GMT
Soviet policies in Europe and the Far East It is well to remember that the Soviet Union faced threats from two directions prior to the outbreak of World War II, from Nazi Germany and from Japan.4 To counter the threat from Japan, the Soviet Union employed diplomacy and military operations. In reaction to the Manchurian Incident, the Soviet government initially adopted an appeasement policy, unsuccessfully offering to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Japanese, and selling the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) to Japan in 1935. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Soviets concluded a non-aggression pact with China and began to provide military aid in order to sink Japan deeper in the quagmire of their war with China. Militarily, the USSR created the Far Eastern Military District, double-tracked the Siberian Railroad, established the Pacific Fleet, increased the number of troops deployed in the Far East, and engaged in successful military operations against the Japanese troops in the Lake Khasan incident of 1938, and the Nomonhan war of 1939.5 After the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the Soviet government concluded the Neutrality Pact with Japan in April 1941, to avoid a two-front war. When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, Stalin ordered the Far Eastern front not to take any actions that might provoke Japan’s attack, while maintaining sizable forces in the Far East. It was only when Stalin was reassured by intelligence sources that Japan was not likely to attack the Soviet Union, that he moved the best divisions in the Far East to bolster the defense of Moscow.6 Once the first imminent threat for survival of the Soviet Union receded in December, 1941, Stalin revealed his intention to join the war against Japan in his conversations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, although he rejected Eden’s request to join the war immediately. The Soviet Union was bound by the Neutrality Pact, Stalin explained, and as long as the nation had to devote all its energy to fight the Germans, it could not wage war on two fronts.7 After the victory of the battle of Stalingrad, however, Stalin began seriously making preparations for the war against Japan. He ordered the NKVD to construct a new railway line to connect Komsomolsk-na-Amure to Sovetskaia Gavan´ on the Pacific Coast. At the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow and at the Teheran Conference in October 1943, he pledged to enter the war against Japan after the capitulation of Germany, a promise that was made to extract Allied agreement to open a second front in Europe. He intended to wage war against Japan for geopolitical interests, regardless of the Allied position, but he managed to sell this demand as if it was his concession to the Allies. At the conference, he made it clear that he would make known in due course his “desiderata” for Soviet entry into the Pacific War.8 Meanwhile, Stalin requested from his foreign policy experts their position papers on Soviet policy toward Japan. Both the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Maiskii, in January and the Ambassador to Tokyo, Iakov Malik, in June, 1944, in separate memoranda advocated obtaining Soviet borders that would assure the future security of the Soviet Union, specifically insisting on regaining southern Sakhalin and the Kurils.9 Both justified these demands in terms of Soviet security, not on the basis of historical legitimacy or any ideological principle. But Maiskii and Malik assumed that these demands should be met by the Allies in a peace conference after the war without the Soviet Union participating in the war. Stalin disagreed. Skeptical about the Allies’ goodwill to honor their commitment to the Soviet demands, Stalin was determined to occupy these territories by military means. War against Japan was a necessary prerequisite to fulfill his goal. In the summer of 1944, Stalin told Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii, Commander of the Belorussian front, about his intention to appoint him commander of the Far Eastern front to oversee Soviet preparations for the war against Japan. In September, in strict secrecy, Stalin ordered the General Staff to draw up estimates for the concentration and logistical support of troops in the Far East in the war against Japan. The General Staff completed the estimates at the beginning of October.10 In December, Stalin for the first time revealed his “desiderata” to Harriman. He brought out a map and said that southern Sakhalin and the Kurils should be returned to the Soviet Union. Stalin then drew a line around the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula including Dairen and Port Arthur, and said that the Soviet Union wished to secure the lease for these ports again. In addition, he also wished to obtain the lease for the CER and the Southern Manchurian Railway, and demanded recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.11 He was determined to acquire everything on this list at the Yalta Conference. Yalta Conference, February 1945 By concluding the Yalta secret agreement with Roosevelt and Churchill at the Yalta Conference Stalin managed to gain the concessions he had revealed to Harriman in return for his pledge to enter the war against Japan three months after the German capitulation.12 With regard to subsequent Soviet policy toward Japan, the following factors should be mentioned. First, the Yalta secret agreement was a masterpiece of Stalin’s diplomatic maneuvering. The article that dealt with the Kurils was separated from the article that stipulated the restoration of Russia’s former rights “violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904.” By insisting that this independent article on the Kurils was as important as the others and carefully using the expression, “handed over,” rather than “restored,” Stalin precluded the possibility that the Kurils would be taken away later as a violation of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration. Moreover, having Roosevelt and Churchill pledge that these claims “shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated,” he made doubly sure that these promises would not be ignored.13 Second, in order for Stalin to gain these war trophies, he had to fulfill two important conditions: participation in the war and agreement with the Chinese government on the Yalta terms. Otherwise, the Allies might renege on their promises at the peace conference. Thus, it was imperative for him not only to enter the war, but to prevent the war from ending before the Soviets joined it. Third, Stalin’s diplomatic success was based on the continuation of his previous tactical maneuvers. Relying on America’s need to secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan, he presented his real objectives as if they were concessions to the United States.
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Post by Admin on Feb 4, 2019 4:24:38 GMT
Abrogation of the Neutrality Pact On April 5, Molotov informed the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Sato Naotake that the Soviet government had no intention to renew the Neutrality Pact. To Sato’s question about whether the Soviet government was annulling the pact forthwith or whether it took the position that the pact was still in force until the end of its original five-year term in April 1946, Molotov stated that the pact would remain in force until it expired. Reconfirming the validity of the Neutrality Pact, while in secret preparing the war against Japan, left unresolved the problem of how to justify the violation of the pact once the Soviets went to war against Japan.14 Why did the Soviet Union renounce the Neutrality Pact? The first explanation is that unless the Soviet government notified the Japanese, the pact would have been renewed automatically for another five years.15 Obviously, Stalin did not wish his countrymen to compare an eventual Soviet violation of the Neutrality Pact with the German violation of the Non-Aggression (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Pact. The more compelling reason was that this was intended as a message to the United States that the Soviet Union was preparing to honor its commitment to enter the war against Japan after Germany’s capitulation at the time when the relationship with the US was becoming increasingly contentious. He had reasonable expectations that the renunciation of the Pact would not provoke Japan’s attack, since he received intelligence reports from Japan that reassured him that Japan would continue to seek Soviet neutrality.16 Nevertheless, before the Soviet government renounced the Pact, Stalin ordered the military leaders in the Far East to place Soviet troops on alert for possible Japanese attacks, to strengthen the protection of the railways, and to reinforce the defense of major cities including Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.17 May-June 1945: Stalin-Hopkins and Hirota-Malik meetings The growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over Poland and the unannounced suspension of Lend Lease prompted Truman to send his special envoy, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow to iron out differences. The Far Eastern question was also an important issue at this meeting. To Hopkins’ question of when the Soviet Union would enter the war, Stalin replied that the Soviet Army would be “in sufficient preparedness” by August 8. Stalin promised, not that the Soviets would enter the war precisely on August 8, but that preparations would be completed by that date. Later, Stalin remarked that the opening of operations would depend on the weather, since the autumn fog could make the campaign difficult.18 Stalin raised the possibility of discussing “the zone of operations for the armies and zones of occupation of Japan.” Hopkins cabled to Truman: “The Marshal expected that Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with the British and us as to occupation zones.”19 Hopkins’ acceptance of this proposal may have whetted Stalin’s appetite and this may have led to his demand during the Soviet Hokkaido-Kuril operations for both a Soviet occupation zone on the northern half of Hokkaido and a Soviet occupation sector in Tokyo.20 The most important point at the Stalin-Hopkins conference was Hopkin’s offer to include concrete proposals for Japan’s surrender on the agenda of the forthcoming Big-Three conference in Potsdam.21 This would give Stalin a justification to enter the war against Japan in violation of the Neutrality Pact. As the emperor and the policymakers in Japan became aware of the impending defeat of the Battle of Okinawa, they decided to seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union to exit from the war. To achieve this goal, the Japanese government entrusted former prime minister and foreign minister Hirota Koki to contact Ambassador Malik on June 7 in an unofficial capacity. During a series of meetings with Malik in June Hirota sounded out the possibility of concluding an alliance or a non-aggression pact, or at least the renewal of the Neutrality Pact. Japan’s ill-advised move fell right into the Soviet trap to prolong the war. Molotov instructed Malik to neither agree on specific conditions nor cut off negotiations. As it turned out, the terms Japan offered to renew the Neutrality Pact were less generous than the written promise that Stalin had obtained from Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. And Malik, as instructed, set a snail’s pace for negotiations by sending the Japanese proposals through the diplomatic pouch.22 The Politburo decides to go to war Stalin summoned a combined meeting of top leaders of the Politburo, the government, and the military on June 26 and 27. This meeting decided to launch an all-out offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria in August. The General Staff’s recommendation that three fronts simultaneously move toward the center of Manchuria met with final approval.23 War against Japan was no longer a secret confined to Stalin and a small circle of his advisers: it became the official policy of the Soviet government. At this conference the geographical parameters of the military operation were discussed. The major objective of the Soviet military operation was to secure all the territories promised by the Yalta Agreement, including Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. The occupation of northern Korea was considered essential to cut off the escape route of the Japanese forces. Opinions were divided, however, on the advisability of the Hokkaido operation. Without the occupation of Hokkaido, the Soviets could not secure control of the Soya Strait and the Kurils. Marshal K.A. Meretskov thus proposed that they occupy the island. This measure was supported by Nikita Khrushchev, but Nikolai Voznesenskii, Molotov, and Marshal Georgii Zhukov opposed the operation as too risky, even likely to provoke counteraction from American forces. Stalin asked Zhukov how many additional divisions would be needed to carry out this operation. The marshal answered at least four. Stalin said nothing further. The question of Hokkaido remained undecided.24 The following day on June 28 Stalin issued three directives, the first to the commander-in-chief of the Far Eastern Front to complete all the preparations for the attack by August 1; the second to the commanders of the troops of the Maritime groups to complete the preparations for attack by July 25; and the third to the commander of the Transbaikal front to complete preparations by July 25.25 These orders did not set the precise date of attack, which would most likely be decided later in consultation with the commanders in the Far East.26 The gigantic war machine in the Far East had been set in motion.
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Post by Admin on Feb 4, 2019 17:35:06 GMT
Pre-Potsdam: Japanese-Soviet and Sino-Soviet negotiations Only after the USSR had made the final decision to wage war against Japan, did the Japanese government abandon its futile attempt through Hirota to conclude an agreement with the Soviets, and requested Soviet mediation to terminate the war. On July 12, Foreign Minister Togo sent a telegram to Ambassador Sato, instructing the ambassador to see Molotov immediately to present the emperor’s message requesting Moscow’s mediation to terminate the war. Togo stated that it was the emperor’s wish to end the war, but made it clear that so long as the Allies demanded unconditional surrender, Japan had no choice but to fight to the last man.27 Molotov, however, refused to meet Sato before his departure for Potsdam. Molotov instructed his deputy, Solomon Lozovskii, not to reject this request outright, but to encourage Sato to clarify the ambiguities in Togo’s telegram with regard to whom it was addressed. Clearly, the Soviets intended to keep Japan waiting to buy more time. Stalin was, however, keenly aware that Japan’s surrender was imminent. Consumed by the fear that the war might end before the Soviet Union could join it, even before the Potsdam Conference began, Stalin called Vasilevskii, and asked him if it would be possible to move up the date of attack by ten days from the August 11 set by the Stavka. Vasilevskii answered that “the concentration of the troops and the transportation of essential war supplies would not permit such a revision” of the attack schedule. Stalin, for the time being, accepted Vasilevskii’s cautious judgment.28 Before entering the war, Stalin had to secure Chiang Kai-shek’s consent to the Yalta provisions. The provisions of the Yalta secret agreement grossly violated the sovereign rights of the Chinese government. Although Chiang Kai-shek was informed about the Yalta secret agreement a few weeks after the conference, he was not formally told of its specific provisions regarding Chinese territory until June 15.29 Stalin and the Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong began negotiations on July 2. Soong was adamant about China’s rights with respect to Outer Mongolia and railways and ports in Manchuria. While China insisted that it could not make concessions on these issues involving sovereignty, to Stalin these represented the indispensable acquisitions on which future Soviet security would depend. The unsuccessful negotiations were broken off when Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Potsdam and Soong returned to Chongqing for further instructions.30 Potsdam Conference Settings Stalin came to Potsdam, assuming that the United States still needed the Soviet entry into the war. He also counted on Hopkins’s assurance that the United States would place the question of a joint ultimatum to Japan on the agenda. Also, Stalin hoped that the United States would exert pressure on the Chinese to accept the Yalta provisions. Thus, Stalin expected Truman, who, he assumed, was as eager as Roosevelt to invite the Soviets to join the war, to help resolve these two obstacles. Before the Potsdam Conference, Truman had faced two irreconcilable dilemmas. The first was how to deal with the Soviets. Truman and his new secretary of State, James Byrnes, began to worry about the implications of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan, which would inevitably expand Soviet influence in Asia. If he could avoid it, Truman would prefer to end the war before the Soviets entered it. Nevertheless, his military advisers argued that even if Soviet participation in the war was no longer necessary to win the war, it would still hasten Japan’s surrender, thereby saving American lives. Truman faced another dilemma over unconditional surrender. Not only was unconditional surrender Roosevelt’s legacy, but this demand was supported by the overwhelming majority of the American people. Truman felt that it was necessary to avenge the humiliation suffered by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor by bringing Japan to its knees by imposing unconditional surrender. But many influential advisers such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, and Navy Secretary James Forrestal came to advocate revision of the surrender conditions in such a way as to allow the Japanese to maintain the monarchical system under the present dynasty. This concession, they argued, would strengthen moderate elements that surrounded the emperor and induce them to seek early surrender. The situation suddenly changed on July 16 when the United States succeeded in exploding the first atomic bomb in Alamogordo in New Mexico. With this powerful new weapon, the US could imagine forcing the Japanese surrender without relying on Soviet participation in the war. It made it possible for Truman to stick to the unconditional surrender demand. With the detonation of the atomic bomb in New Mexico, the major goal of Truman and Byrnes now shifted to securing Japan’s surrender before the Soviets could enter the war.31 Stalin-Truman meetings: July 17 and July 18 At the first Stalin-Truman meeting on July 17 prior to the opening of the conference, Stalin told Truman that the Soviet Union was ready to enter the war “by the middle of August,” but he said that prior to the Soviet entry into the war he would need to reach an agreement with the Chinese. Although the Soviet record of this meeting makes us believe that it was Truman who solicited the Soviet entry into the war and requested information about the Sino-Soviet negotiations, the American record makes it clear that it was Stalin, who without Truman’s prodding volunteered to express his intention to enter the war, and brought up the issue of the Sino-Soviet negotiations.32 Differences between the two versions of this meeting speak volumes about the different expectations each leader had of the other. Stalin felt that Truman should feel gratitude for his commitment to enter the war “by the middle of August.” For this pledge to enter the war, Stalin expected Truman to reward him by putting pressure on the Chinese to come to an agreement with the USSR. But Truman was ambiguous about the Soviet entry into the war. In his Potsdam diary, Truman wrote: “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.” This passage, often taken by historians as the convincing evidence that Truman welcomed the Soviet entry into the war must be balanced by the passage that preceded it: “I asked if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite — but I have some dynamite too which I’m not exploding now.”33 Truman and Byrnes were working out a “timetable” to force Japan’s surrender. They wished to avoid Soviet entry into the war, and they were determined to use the atomic bomb for that purpose. With Stalin’s reference to the date of Soviet entry into the war either “by the middle of August” or “in the middle of August,” Truman believed that the Soviets would enter the war on August 15.34 Stalin wanted the U.S. pressure on China to come to an agreement by volunteering the information that the Soviets were ready to enter the war. But he was disappointed, because although Byrnes committed himself to the Yalta secret agreement, he warned that the United States would not support any provisions that went beyond the Yalta provisions. Furthermore, Truman and Byrnes insisted on the free port status of Dairen.35 Clearly, the Americans were not playing the game as Stalin had hoped (FRUS: Potsdam, vol. 2, p. 1584.) On July 18, when Truman paid a return visit to Stalin’s villa, Stalin revealed the information that the Japanese had asked Moscow to mediate in ending the war. He revealed to Truman Ambassador Sato’s note requesting Soviet mediation to terminate the war. According to the American record, “Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and that it might be desirable to lull the Japanese to sleep, and possibly a general and unspecific answer might be returned, pointing out that the exact character of the proposed Konye [sic] mission was not clear.” Truman agreed.36 Stalin was eager to prolong the war until all the preparations for his attack were completed, while Truman was also interested in prolonging the war only until the atomic bomb could be dropped to shock the Japanese into surrender (FRUS: Potsdam, vol. 2, 1587-1588.)
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Post by Admin on Feb 4, 2019 20:47:13 GMT
Truman tells Stalin half-truth about the atomic bomb General Leslie Groves’ detailed report of the atomic bomb test in Alamogordo reached Truman on July 21. This was the “dynamite” Truman had eagerly been waiting for. With the atomic bomb, he was confident that the United States could unilaterally force Japan to surrender without the Soviet Union. It became important, therefore, to exclude Stalin from the joint ultimatum to Japan. The atomic bomb also made it possible, he believed, to dictate unconditional surrender to Japan.37 During a recess of the Potsdam Conference on July 24, Truman approached Stalin and casually revealed that the United States now possessed “a new weapon of unusual destructive force.” Stalin showed no interest, at least so it seemed to the president.38 But Stalin was not fooled. Through the Soviet spies planted in the Manhattan Project, Stalin was aware that the United States was about to explode the first atomic bomb. Truman’s half-truth must have provoked Stalin’s suspicion.39 Something must have changed in Stalin’s thinking after Truman’s less-than-truthful revelation about the atomic bomb. After receiving Ambassador Sato’s clarifications about the Konoe mission on July 25, Deputy Foreign Commissar Lozovskii sent his recommendations as to how to respond to Japan’s latest peace overtures. He suggested that the Soviet government continue to use stalling tactics by requesting the specific proposals that Konoe would bring to Moscow. Molotov flatly rejected this recommendation, writing in the margin of Lozovskii’s dispatch “Not necessary [Ne to].” The time to fool Japan was over. All efforts now had to be concentrated on waging a war against Japan.40 Potsdam proclamation Truman’s half-truth about the atomic bomb piqued Stalin’s suspicion, but an even greater shock was waiting for him. Contrary to Stalin’s expectations, Truman was no longer interested in bringing Stalin into the joint ultimatum. Truman and Byrnes had been engaged in revising the draft proclamation they had received from Stimson on July 2, and in this revision they had been consulting with the British in strict secrecy behind the backs of the Soviet delegation.41 They deleted the passage that Stimson had recommended in his original draft that would have allowed the possibility of Japan’s retaining the monarchical system under the present dynasty. Truman and Byrnes also crossed out all references to the Soviet participation in the war that had been included in Stimson’s original draft. At 7 p.m. Potsdam time on July 26, the Potsdam Proclamation was given to the press to be released. At 4 p.m. Washington time American West-Coast shortwave radio stations began transmitting the text to Japan. After the press release, Byrnes sent a copy of the ultimatum to Molotov as a “diplomatic courtesy”. Caught by surprise, Molotov immediately asked Byrnes to postpone the announcement for two or three days, but Byrnes told Molotov that it was too late, since the proclamation had already been handed to the press.42 We now know that the Soviets had prepared their own version of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Soviet draft began: “The time has come when the Governments of the Allied democratic countries — the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union — have recognized that it is essential to make a joint declaration about our relations with Japan.” It then listed Japan’s transgressions, from its attack on China to its “treacherous” attack on Pearl Harbor, “the same perfidious surprise attack by which it had attacked Russia forty years ago.” The draft stated: “People all over the world have a burning desire to terminate the continuing war. The United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union consider it their duty to take joint, decisive measures immediately to bring the war to an end.” Finally, the document called on Japan to “lay down arms and surrender without any conditions.”43 The document reveals the Soviet approach to the joint ultimatum. It is striking in its conciliatory tone towards the Allies, indicating how desperately Stalin wished to issue a joint declaration against Japan with the United States and Britain. But was Stalin not concerned that the issuance of such a joint declaration might immediately lead to Japan’s surrender, thereby circumventing his ultimate objective of actually waging war against Japan to earn the trophies promised at Yalta? To avoid this undesirable outcome, the Soviet draft included a call for “unconditional surrender.” The Soviet government was fully aware that the inclusion of this demand would lead Japan to continue the war, thus guaranteeing the prolongation of the war until the Soviet attack. Stalin and Molotov must have hoped that the issuance of the ultimatum might be postponed to coincide with the Soviet offensive. This expectation was by no means far-fetched, given that the Operation Division of the U.S. War Department had originally envisaged the optimal timing of the ultimatum as the moment of Soviet entry into the war.44 When Byrnes met Molotov on July 27, the Secretary explained that he had not received Molotov’s request for postponement of the ultimatum until that morning. This was a flat lie, since Molotov through his interpreter had made this request as soon as he received the text on the evening of July 26. On July 29, Stalin proposed that the United States and Britain extend their formal request to Stalin to append his signature to the joint ultimatum. This request placed Truman and Byrnes in an awkward position. Byrnes wrote: “We had, of course, begun to hope that a Japanese surrender might be imminent and we did not want to urge the Russians to enter the war.” But they could not ignore Stalin’s request. In the end, the United States made a tortuous argument that the Soviet Union could declare war against Japan on the basis of Paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, as well as the United Nations Charter Articles 103 and 106.45 Obviously, this was a flimsy legal basis, since the Moscow Declaration was signed only by three states, and the United Nations Charter had not been ratified. Japan had nothing to do with these documents. The main point of all this was that the United States rejected Stalin’s request to extend a formal invitation to the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan.46 Byrnes wrote: I must frankly admit that in view of what we knew of Soviet actions in eastern Germany and the violations of the Yalta agreements in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war. Notwithstanding Japan’s persistent refusal to surrender unconditionally, I believed the atomic bomb would be successful and would force the Japanese to accept surrender on our terms.47 The “timetable” that Truman and Byrnes had worked out became clear. Truman’s intention was to gain Japan’s surrender with the atomic bomb before the Soviet entry, and Stalin’s objective was to enter the war before Japan’s surrender. It was, indeed, a “race to the finish.” - Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 208. Stalin was fooled. He did not succeed in appending his signature to the joint ultimatum. But this failure reaped an unexpected benefit. The Japanese government noticed two things in the Potsdam ultimatum. First, Stalin did not sign the ultimatum, and second, the ultimatum contained the unconditional surrender demand without clarifying the position of the emperor. Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro declared that he would “mokusatu” – ignore – the ultimatum. Japan would continue to seek Moscow’s mediation to terminate the war.48
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Post by Admin on Feb 5, 2019 17:50:15 GMT
Stalin’s reaction to the Potsdam proclamation The fiasco of the Potsdam Proclamation convinced Stalin that Truman had decided to force Japan’s surrender unilaterally before the Soviet entry into the war. His reaction was immediate. On July 30, he appointed Vasilevskii as supreme commander of the Soviet troops in the Far East as of August 1.49 On August 2, Stavka ordered the formation of three fronts: the First Far Eastern Front under Marshal Kirill Meretskov, the Second Far Eastern Front under General Maksim Purkaev, and the Transbaikal Front under Marshal Rodion Malinovskii. The cloak of secrecy had been cast off.50 The Potsdam Conference was over on August 2, and the Soviet delegation left Berlin that day and returned to Moscow on August 5. On August 3, Chief of Staff Colonel-General S.P. Ivanov and “Colonel General Vasiliev: (Vasilevskii’s nom de guerre) sent an important report on the situation of the front to Stalin and Antonov. Vasilevskii first stated that the troops of the Transbaikal Front were completing the advance to the designated area of concentration about fifty to sixty kilometers from the border so that by the morning of August 5, they would be ready, “in accordance with your instructions.” The report estimated that from the moment of receiving the order to cross the border to the actual beginning of action, “a minimum of five full days will be required.” It then suggested that “the optimal time for the initiation of action” that was to say “crossing the border,” would be “August 9-10.” After the initial border crossing by the elite troops of the Transbaikal Front, the First and the Second Far Eastern Fronts should initiate action “on the same day and at the same time.” In other words, contrary to the previous operationa plan, Vasilevskii proposed the attack in two waves, first by the border crossing by the elite troops of the Transbaikal Front, and then the simultaneous attacks by the First and the Second Far Eastern Fronts. Further it requested “no later than August 5” the final instructions about the date of the beginning of the attack for the First and the Second Far Eastern Fronts as well as “about other related questions, especially of a “political and diplomatic nature.”51 This report suggests that the change of the date of attack from the previously agreed August 11 to August 9-10 was more than likely a response to a Stalin request to move up the date. Since this report was dispatched on August 3, Stalin’s request must have been sent earlier than that date. It is most likely, although it cannot be determined from any available sources, that the order was issued from Potsdam on July 30, at the same time when Vasilevskii was officially appointed the commander of the Soviet Army in the Far East, after Truman rejected Stalin’s last attempt to obtain the Western Allies’ invitation to join the Potsdam ultimatum. Vasilevskii’s request for instructions regarding questions of a “political and diplomatic nature” strongly suggests that the change of date was dictated by political motivations arising from the Potsdam ultimatum. After receiving Vasilevskii’s recommendation to advance the date of attack by one to two days, however, the Stavka seems to have turned down this request, presumably judging that to do so would be too risky. An element of surprise was a crucial component of the entire strategy, and all troops across the long border had to attack on the same day and at the same time. As previously agreed, the precise time of attack was set at midnight Chita time on August 11 (6 p.m. Moscow time on August 10).52
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