Post by Admin on Aug 25, 2013 15:32:51 GMT
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 4 5, VOLUME II
sible measures of international control (The New World, 1939/1946,
Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee
[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.
Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
The Hon. C. D. Howe
Dr. Vannevar Bush
By Invitation: The Right Hon. The Earl of Halifax
Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. George Harrison 28
Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Mr. Roger Makins29
3. Use of Weapon Against Third Parties.
FIELD MARSHAL WILSON stated that the British Government con-
curred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan. He added that
-the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the Presi-
dent at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.30
The Comnmittee.-Took note that the Governments of the United
Kingdom and the United States had agreed that T. A. weapons should
be used by the United States against Japan, the agreement of the
British Government having been communicated by Field Marshal
Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.
-4. Disclosure of Information by the Two Governments on the Use
of the Weapon.
THE CHAIRMAN said there were two conclusions:
1. The scientific principle of the weapon would inevitably be known
as soon as it is used, and other countries would understand that one
of three or four processes had been employed.
28 Special Consultant to the Secretary of War.
29British Minister in Washington.
30 Reference is to the Potsdam Conference, July 16-August 2, 1945; for
references to documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, The Con-
ference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. i, Index, entries
Japan, p. 1072; ibid., vol. ii, Index, entries under Atomic energy, p. 1604,
Japan, p. 1623. (This publication is hereinafter referred to as Conference
- The use of atomic bombs or Tube Alloys was not a sole American decision and it required a British agreement to use the atomic bombs against third parties based on the Quebec Agreement in 1943 on coordinated development of atomic weapons. According to the declassified minutes, British Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson told the meeting chaired by Henry Stimson that the British government “concurred in the use of the T.A. weapon against Japan.” Truman later got the green light from Churchill at Potsdam when the two leaders met and it brought the war to a swift end when Japan was ready for a protracted war in mainland Japan.
Post by Admin on Aug 28, 2013 5:11:48 GMT
Japan's leaders knew nothing about the atomic bomb and little about other U.S. war plans. But Truman and his advisers knew something about what the Japanese leaders were saying and doing. American intelligence had broken Japan's secret code.
By summer 1945, Japan was a nation on the edge of defeat. Its navy hardly existed. Its best airplane pilots had been killed. Its large armies lay scattered and isolated throughout Asia. The American naval blockade of Japan had stopped most shipping, which created major shortages of food and oil. Continuing American bombing raids had leveled most major Japanese cities, killing 200,000 persons.
Still, Japan fought on. From April to June 1944 during the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, an island 400 miles from the Japanese homeland, Japanese forces waged a fierce and desperate battle. Inspired by warrior traditions, the soldiers held on for weeks preferring to die in suicide charges or by their own hand than to surrender. The navy launched waves of suicide airplane attacks on the U.S. ships supporting the invasion. Even many Japanese civilians living on the island killed themselves to avoid capture by the Americans. In finally conquering the island, U.S. forces suffered 48,000 casualties.
In spite of the loss of Okinawa and overwhelming U.S. military superiority, the Japanese government was deadlocked about what to do. On the one hand, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki took office in April 1945 with the goal of ending the hopeless war effort. Suzuki, his foreign minister, and others in the government attempted to get the Soviet Union to act as a go-between in negotiating conditions of surrender to end the war with the United States, Britain, and China. Suzuki was not aware that Stalin had already decided to declare war on Japan in a few months.
Other members of the Japanese government and military leadership strongly opposed surrendering. They argued that Japan should accept "the honorable death of a hundred million" rather than give up. They moved ahead with plans for defending the homeland including the use of 350,000 troops, preparing thousands of pilots and planes for kamikaze attacks and mobilization of hundreds of thousands of civilians, including women, as home defense fighters. They hoped that these measures could repel an American invasion and force the United States to end the war on terms more beneficial to Japan.www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-15-3-b-choices-truman-hirohito-and-the-atomic-bomb.html
Post by Admin on Aug 29, 2013 6:08:24 GMT
From the evidence contained in the documents, it may be concluded that military brothels were established on all the larger islands of the Dutch East Indies during the Japanese occupation and that European women were put to work in these establishments on Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Ambon, Flores and Timor. Though their number cannot be determined exactly on the basis... of the material available, some two hundred to three hundred European women were probably involved, most of whomon the island of Java.
In 1944, the approximately one hundred women working in military brothels on Java were transferred to Kota Paris internment camp at Buitenzorg, and later to Kramat camp near Batavia. However, an unknown number of European women were still working in the remaining military brothels and, by 1944,some women had left the brothels to live with a Japanese man or had been interned in the camps.The following is of relevance with regard to the number of European women that were forced into working as prostitutes. Account must be taken of the possibility that the women outside the camps who were recruited for the brothels were not only in serious social and financial straits and under pressure from the civil and military police, but were also the victims of direct physical force on the part of the Japanese authorities.
The information available contained no information on force of this type being exerted to procure women for the privately-run brothels. Nonetheless, force was most certainly used during the second stage,(mid-1943 to mid-1944) to recruit European women from the camps for Japanese military brothels or for transport to brothels elsewhere. The incidents in question concern the thirty to thirty-five European women from Muntilan camp and the camps near Semarang on Central Java who were recruited for the Japanese military brothels, the seven women who were transported from Semarang to Flores, the unknown number of women transported to the military brothels at Pekalongan and Bondowoso (at least three and six respectively}, the five to ten women who were transported from Java to Timor and the unknown number of women who were transported from Java to Ambon. This group does not include the women from the camps who volunteered for work in the brothels. An exception may, however, be made for those women who volunteered to take the places of those who were forcibly taken to Magelang and Semarang. However,evidence must show that these women acted purely with this intention in mind;consequently, their activities prior to internment and their conduct in the brothels should also be taken into account. The conclusion must be drawn that the majority of the women concerned does not belong to the group of women forced into prostitution. Too little information is available on the circumstances in which the other European women were recruited for the military brothels to establish with any certainty whether force was exerted in their cases. To conclude, the documents available reveal that of the two hundred to three hundred European women working in the Japanese military brothels in the Dutch East Indies, some sixty-five were most certainly forced into prostitution.Bart van Poelgeest, Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the Forced. Prostitution of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies
A couple of documents from early 1938, one from the War Ministry and one from the Home Ministry, hint at the growth of arbitrary methods of recruitment. The former states: "As a result of those engaging in recruitment not being suitably selected, there have been cases of recruitment methods amounting to abduction, which have resulted in charges and investigation by police authorities". According to the latter, "if proper control is lacking in such recruitment of women, this will not only injure the dignity of the Empire and the honor of the Imperial Forces but will have an undesirable effect on the home front, particularly the families of soldiers on active service". By 1943 however, the situation had reached the stage illustrated by an official order recorded in a diary entry preserved by Yoshida Seiji. In this example, the Western Army Headquarters orders the procurement by 30 May of two hundred women from Korea, to be aged eighteen to twenty-nine ("married permissible, except pregnant") and free from venereal disease. Their term was to be one year (as prescribed in the labor draft laws but voluntarily renewable). They were to receive an advance payment of twenty yen and a monthly wage of thirty yen (twice a private soldier's pay) (Hicks, 1997: 314).
In the occupied areas all of these varied methods applied in different circumstances. Sometimes existing brothels or professional women were utilised, subject to health checks and general supervision. Sometimes women tried military prostitution as an alternative to existing hardships, as in internment camps. A record of internment life in Java, while noting cases of forcible or deceptive recruitment, adds: "There were others who went voluntarily because they couldn't stand the restrictions of camp life anymore". Sometimes they [the comfort women] might be included in social amusements in the company of troops. A typical case of this kind occurs in a United States report: "While in Burma they amused themselves by participating in sports events with both officers and men; and attended picnics, entertainments and social dinners. They had a phonograph; and in the towns were allowed to go shopping". Sometimes, however, confinement was much closer. An official document relating to comfort stations in Iloilo in the Philippines contains a map, indicating where the Filipina comfort women were allowed to walk from 8 AM to 10 AM each morning, any other movement requiring permission from the local military administration (Hicks, 1997: 315).
Additionally, in 1945, in depositions of three Korean civilians in the employment of the Japanese Army, they stated “In the battle zones of the Pacific War, the Korean comfort women we met were all either volunteers, or women who had been sold by their parents. If any of the women had been victims of coercion, all Koreans, young and old, would have risen up in rage, regardless of whatever retaliation, and killed the Japanese” (Composite Report Three Korean Civilians List No. 78, March 28, 1945, Special Questions on Koreans, U.S. National Archives).
A recruitment ad for military ‘comfort women’ from the October 27, 1944 edition of the Korean newspaper Maeil Sinbo.
"Military" Comfort Women Urgent Recruitment
- Destination – *** Camp Comfort Woman Station
- Qualifications for Recruitment – Age between 18 and 30; good physical health
- Recruitment Period – From October 27 to November 8
- Departure Date – Approximately November 10
- Contract and Remuneration – Decided immediately after interview with individual
- Number of Recruits – Ten
- Aspirants should make urgent inquiries at the following place: Kyeongseong-bu, Jongro-gu, Akwon-jeong 195 Inside Joseon Inn Gwang (3) 2645 Mr. Heo
The extent of the Nanjing Massacre is widely exaggerated and the number of civilian victims was actually around 20,000 along with 40,000 Chinese soldiers executed without due process of law during the initial period of the Japanese occupation of Nanjing. Most academics agree that the 300,000 death toll often cited by the Chinese government is too high and it was technically impossible to massacre so many people in a limited period of time. The population of Nanjing was around 250,000 in the 1930s and 70% of Chinese civilians managed to flee the city before it came under siege by the IJA. John Rabe, a German businessman who is known for his work to protect the Chinese civilians during the incident, helped to establish the Nanking Safety Zone. Approximately 200,000 Chinese civilians were sheltered in the Nanking Safety Zone, which amounted to more than 70% of the city of population, and he said in his post-war lectures: "We Europeans put the number [of civilian casualties] at about 50,000 to 60,000." Unlike the Holocaust, it was not sanctioned by the Japanese government at the time and incompetent local commanders and rogue soldiers were responsible for the atrocities committed in Nanjing and the military prostitution system was put in place to prevent recurrence of the incident.
Post by Admin on Sept 2, 2013 21:42:39 GMT
Churchill, whose memories of British losses during World War I at Gallipoli in Turkey made him resistant to an amphibious attack on France, preferred what he called the soft underbelly strategy of attacking German power through Italy and the Balkans. But because Britain had become the least powerful of the Allies as America’s role in the fighting expanded and Britain’s shrank, he had to give in to Roosevelt and Stalin’s pressure for the 1944 D-Day invasion of France. Churchill demonstrated Britain’s diminished power by traveling to Moscow in October 1944 to make a sphere-of-influence agreement with Stalin about their degrees of control in postwar eastern and southeastern Europe. At the meeting, Churchill and Stalin made the “percentage’s agreement” describing how much say each of them would have over Romania (90 percent Soviet, 10 percent British); Bulgaria (75 percent Soviet, 25 percent British); Yugoslavia (50 percent each); and Greece (90 percent Britain and the United States). “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner?” Churchill asked Stalin. “Let us burn the paper,” Churchill proposed. “No,” replied Stalin, who was eager to have a record of Churchill’s readiness to concede Soviet control over so much of Europe. “You keep it.”WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West . In Depth . Uneasy Allies | PBS
The Japanese occupation of French Indochina was formally recognised by Vichy France based on an accord in 1940 which granted Japan the rights to station troops in Indochina. But the US embargoed all oil exports to Japan, which was left with less than two years of oil supply and moved further into seizing oil resources in the Dutch East Indies. President Roosevelt acted like a typical Democrat opposing Japanese imperialism on human rights grounds at the time but Churchill had been secretly lobbying for further American involvement in the war against the Axis powers. Thus Roosevelt was determined to do everything short of war in order to provoke Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan into attacking America first and Roosevelt was also endeavouring with all the means at his disposal to provoke German U-boats lurking in the Atlantic aside from exerting diplomatic pressure on Imperial Japan. To make the US a belligerent power without firing the first shot, all he needed was a minor incident similar to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, which drew America into the Vietnam War.
Churchill's copy of the Atlantic Charter
Churchill and Roosevelt met on August 9 and 10, 1941 aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, to discuss their respective war aims for the Second World War and to outline a postwar international system. The Charter they drafted included eight "common principles" that the United States and Great Britain would be committed to supporting in the postwar world. Both countries agreed not to seek territorial expansion; to seek the liberalization of international trade; to establish freedom of the seas, and international labor, economic, and welfare standards. Most importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were committed to supporting the restoration of self-governments for all countries that had been occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own form of government. While the meeting was successful in drafting these aims, it failed to produce the desired results for either leader. President Roosevelt had hoped that the Charter might encourage the American people to back U.S. intervention in World War II on behalf of the Allies; however, public opinion remained adamantly opposed to such a policy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Churchill's primary goal in attending the Atlantic Conference was "to get the Americans into the war." Barring that, he hoped that the United States would increase its amount of military aid to Great Britain and warn Japan against taking any aggressive actions in the Pacific.history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/AtlanticConf
Perras, Galen. "‘Future plays will depend on how the next one works’: Franklin Roosevelt and the Canadian Legation Discussions of January 1938." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9.2 (2007). jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/115/126
Beatty, David. "The ‘Canadian Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine and the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940." The McNaughton Papers 5 (1994): 30-45. www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol01/tnm_1_1_3-22.pdf
Post by Admin on Nov 14, 2013 16:59:08 GMT
Concerned about the looming threats and dangers upon the lives of Chinese, a small band of foreigners who had resided in Nanking decided to stay and initiate systematic efforts to save the lives of the Chinese civilians. In early December, these people established the Nanking Safety Zone, a 3.86 square kilometer piece of land in the western part of Nanking, whose purpose was to offer a refuge for civilians during the battle. They planned that the zone would provide food, shelter, and medical care for these refugees, and if necessary, protective intervention against the attack of Japanese soldiers. The foreigners formed an International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone consisting of 7 Americans, 4 Britons, 1 Dane, and 3 Germans.
When Nanking fell, the Nanking Safety Zone housed over 250,000 refugees. The committee members of the Zone found ways to provide these refugees with the basic needs of food, shelter, and medical care. Whenever Japanese soldiers entered the Zone, they were closely shadowed by one of the Westerners. The Westerners repeatedly refused to comply with demands made of them by Japanese Army soldiers, placing themselves between Japanese soldiers and Chinese civilians. Around 500,000 to 600,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers failed to evacuate the city due to the speed of their defeat.
Members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. December 1937.
Rabe was elected as its leader, in part because of his status as a member of the Nazi party and the existence of the German–Japanese bilateral Anti-Comintern Pact. This committee established the Nanking Safety Zone in the western quarter of the city. The Japanese government had agreed not to attack parts of the city that did not contain Chinese military forces, and the members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone attempted to persuade the Chinese government to move all their troops out of the area. They were partly successful.
Photo taken in Nanking Safety Zone on Dec. 15, 1937, two days after the Japanese occupation.
The documentary Nanking credited him for saving the lives of 250,000 Chinese civilians. Other sources suggest that Rabe rescued between 200,000 and 250,000 Chinese people. John Rabe gave a series of lectures in Germany after he came back to Berlin on April 15, 1938, in which he said, "We Europeans put the number [of civilian casualties] at about 50,000 to 60,000." Rabe was not the only figure to record the Japanese atrocity. By December 1937, after the defeat of the Chinese soldiers, the Japanese soldiers would often go house-to-house in Nanking, shooting any civilians they encountered. Evidence of these violent acts come from diaries kept by some Japanese soldiers and by Japanese journalists who were appalled by what was transpiring.
On December 17, Rabe wrote a letter as chairman to Kiyoshi Fukui, second secretary of the Japanese Embassy. The following is an excerpt:
In other words, on the 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone in which there had been very little destruction by stray shells and no looting by Chinese soldiers even in full retreat... All 27 Occidentals in the city at that time and our Chinese population were totally surprised by the reign of robbery, raping and killing initiated by your soldiers on the 14th. All we are asking in our protest is that you restore order among your troops and get the normal city life going as soon as possible. In the latter process we are glad to cooperate in any way we can. But even last night between 8 and 9 p.m. when five Occidental members of our staff and Committee toured the Zone to observe conditions, we did not find any single Japanese patrol either in the Zone or at the entrances!
Having received no answer to his request, Rabe wrote again to Fukui the following day, this time in an even more desperate tone:
We are sorry to trouble you again but the sufferings and needs of the 200 000 civilians for whom we are trying to care make it urgent that we try to secure action from your military authorities to stop the present disorder among Japanese soldiers wandering through the Safety Zone... The second man in our Housing Commission had to see two women in his family at 23 Hankow Road raped last night at supper time by Japanese soldiers. Our associate food commissioner, Mr. Sone, has to convey trucks with rice and leave 2,500 people in families at his Nanking Theological Seminary to look after themselves. Yesterday, in broad daylight, several women at the Seminary were raped right in the middle of a large room filled with men, women, and children! We 22 Occidentals cannot feed 200,000 Chinese civilians and protect them night and day. That is the duty of the Japanese authorities ...
During the Korean War (1950–53), the government of the People's Republic of China used records of the International Committee to portray its members as part of a propaganda campaign to arouse patriotic anti-American fervor. As part of this propaganda campaign, the Westerners who remained in Nanking were characterized as foreigners who sacrificed Chinese lives in order to protect their property, guided the Japanese troops into the city and collaborated with them to round up prisoners of war in the refugee camps. As a result of this anti-American propaganda, a detailed study carried out by the researchers at the University of Nanking in 1962 went so far as to assert that Westerners had assisted the Japanese in executing Chinese in Nanking. The study harshly criticized those foreigners for not having made any effort to prevent the ongoing atrocities. This erroneous perception of the International Committee was eventually corrected in the 1980s as more historical documents became accessible and more thorough studies were published. Today many of the missionaries' private diaries and letters that meticulously documented the scale and character of the Nanking Massacre are archived at the Yale Divinity School Library.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Rabe